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Abstract 
From the proliferation of community bail funds to the implementation 
of new risk assessment tools to the limitation and even eradication of 
monetary bail, reform movements have altered the landscape of pretrial 
detention. Yet, reform movements have paid little attention to the 
emerging reality of a post-monetary-bail world. With monetary bail an 
unavailable or disfavored option, courts have come to rely increasingly 
on nonmonetary conditions of release. These nonmonetary conditions can 
be problematic for many of the same reasons that monetary bail is 
problematic and can inject additional bias into the pretrial system. 
In theory, nonmonetary conditions offer increased opportunities for 
release over monetary bail and can be narrowly tailored to accomplish 
specific goals. Yet, the proposition that nonmonetary conditions 
accomplish their purported goals is untested and unsettled. Pretrial 
release conditions are often imposed at the conclusion of a remarkably 
brief pretrial hearing and in a near rote fashion, with little or no evidence 
that the conditions are necessary to avoid the risk or risks that fuel them. 
Defendants-many of whom are unrepresented at these hearings-may 
be ill-equipped, financially or otherwise, to comply with these conditions. 
Noncompliance may place defendants at risk of either additional criminal 
charges or future pretrial detention. 
This Article argues that the reduction or eradication of monetary bail 
alone has not, and will not, ensure a fair and unbiased system of pretrial 
detention, nor will it ensure that poor and marginalized defendants will 
benefit from pretrial release. Rather, these reforms have shifted the 
burden of release from paying monetary bail to paying fees for a laundry 
list of pretrial release conditions. If pretrial detention reform is to achieve 
meaningful results, it must address not just the most apparent barrier to 
release-the fee charged in the form of bail-but all barriers that promote 
pretrial incarceration and impose unjustified burdens on defendants 
awaiting trial. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last five decades, few criminal justice reform movements have 
enjoyed the level of success of pretrial detention reform movements.1 
From early efforts in the 1960s by the Vera Institute for Justice 2 to 
1. This Article uses the term "pretrial detention reform movements" to encompass a 
variety of movements, including bail reform movements. 
2. See WAYNE H. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 11 (1976). One of the Vera 
Institute's early vehicles for bail reform was the Manhattan Bail Project, which sought to decrease 
pretrial detention and the use of bail as a means of release. MARION C. KATZIVE, VERA INST. FOR 
new-areas-for-bail-reform-a-report-on-the-manhattan-bail-reevaluation-project-june-1966-august-
defendants and made predictions about probability of flight based on factors including ties to the 
community, job stability, and prior criminal history. Id. The Project proved incredibly accurate at 
predicting flight risk and served as a catalyst for early bail reform. See id. For a description of the 
Vera Institute's original Manhattan Bail Project, see id.; Bernard Botein, The Manhattan Bail 
JUST., NEW AREAS FOR BAIL REFORM 2 (1968), https://www.vera.org/downloads/Publications/ 
1967/legacydownloads/1497.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VNF-WB8T]. The Project interviewed 
Project: Its Impact on Criminology and the Criminal Process, 43 TEx. L. REV. 319, 326-27 
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modern community bail movements, 3 reform efforts have succeeded in 
calling attention to the regressive bail system, 4 limiting or eradicating 
monetary bail,5 and utilizing risk assessment tools to determine 
(1965); Charles E. Ares et al., The ManhattanBailProject:An InterimReport on the Use ofPre-
TrialParole,38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 76-86 (1963). 
3. The community-based bail movement is one of many community-based criminal justice 
reform movements that have focused on the issue of pretrial detention. For an excellent 
description of such movements, see Jocelyn Simonson, BailNullfication, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 
599-606 (2017). 
4. See Samuel R. Wiseman, BailandMassIncarceration,53 GA. L. REV. 235, 273 (2018); 
Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences ofMisdemeanorPretrialDetention, 69 STAN. 
L. REV. 711, 719-20 (2017). 
5. California, New York, New Jersey, the District of Columbia, and Philadelphia-to 
name a few-have all done away with some or all monetary bail. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.10 
(West 2020); MICHAEL REMPEL & KRYSTAL RODRIGUEZ, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, NEW YORK'S 
BAIL REFORM LAW: SUMMARY OF MAJOR COMPONENTS 1-2 (2019), 
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2019/Bail_Reform_NY_Su 
mmary.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WA3-C7VP1; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11; GLENN A. GRANT, N.J. 
JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE FOR 
CALENDAR YEAR 2017, at 26 (2018), https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2017 
cjrannual.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQ9L-CWHU]; Josie Duffy Rice, New Jersey Passes New Bail 
Reform Law, Changing Lives of Poor Defendants, DAILY KOS (Jan. 3, 2017, 2:45 PM), 
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2017/1/3/1616714/-New-Jersey-passes-new-bail-reform-law-
changing-lives-of-poor-defendants [https://perma.cc/CQ6T-E2VQ]; Molly O'Brien, New Bail 
and Speedy Trial Laws Take Effect in New Jersey, NEW BRUNSWICK TODAY (Jan. 28, 2017), 
http://newbrunswicktoday.com/article/new-bail-and-speedy-trial-laws-take-effect-new-jersey 
[https://perma.cc/J86U-K2SH]; AnnE. Marimow, When It Comes to PretrialRelease, Few Other 
Jurisdictions Do It D.C.'s Way, WASH. POST (July 4, 2016), https://www.washington 
post.com/local/public-safety/when-it-comes-to-pretrial-release-few-other-jurisdictions-do-it-dcs 
-way/2016/07/04/8eb52134-e7d3-11e5-bOfd-073d5930a7b7_story.htmlutmtern=.2a5b8a415 
f53 [https://perma.cc/DYB5-XP8J]; Samantha Melamed, Philly DA Larry Krasner 
Stopped Seeking BailforLow-Level Crimes. Here's WhatHappenedNext., PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 
19, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/philly-district-attorney-larry-krasner-money-bail-
criminal-justice-reform-incarceration-20 190219.html [https://perma.cc/YE3K-G57L]. 
While it is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that even as bail reform 
movements have succeeded in furthering legislation and internal prosecutorial policies that limit 
or eradicate monetary bail, recent critique of such reforms includes allegations that prosecutors 
and judges often impose bail despite these policies. See Bryce Covert, ProgressivePhilly D.A. 
Larry Krasner's Bail Reform Plans Seem Stalled, Advocates Say, APPEAL (June 25, 2019), 
https://theappeal.org/progressive -philly-d-a-larry-krasners-bail-reform-plans-seem-stalled-
advocates-say/ [https://perma.cc/7HHS-AW62]. In addition, such reforms in New York State 
have met significant opposition and arguably limited success. See, e.g., Bernadette Hogan & Carl 
Campanile, Jay Jacobs, Chair of New York State Democratic Party, Urges Changes to Bail 
Reforms, N.Y. POST (Feb. 4, 2020), https://nypost.com/2020/02/04/jay -jacobs-chair-of-new-york-
state-democratic-party-urges-changes-to-bail-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/JRS8-QQVJ]; Jesse 
McKinley et al., Why Abolishing Bailfor Some Crimes Has Law Enforcement on Edge, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/31/nyregion/cash-bail-reform-new-
york.html [https://perma.cc/CS4P-PVWR]. 
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probability of flight or danger to the community.6 In the wake of such 
reform movements, much work has been done to highlight potential bias 
embedded in risk assessment tools7-whether in their construction or in 
the data they rely on-but little attention has been paid to the emerging 
reality of a post-monetary-bail world. With monetary bail an unavailable 
or disfavored option, courts not only refuse to release some defendants 
altogether, but they also rely increasingly on nonmonetary conditions of 
release to mitigate whatever perceived risks a defendant poses.' These 
nonmonetary conditions of release can be problematic for many of the 
same reasons that monetary bail is problematic and can inject additional 
bias into the pretrial system. 9 Yet, the proposition that such nonmonetary 
conditions accomplish their purported goals is untested and unsettled.10 
Nonmonetary conditions of release can include requirements of court 
attendance, no new law violations, drug or alcohol testing, no-contact 
orders, electronic home monitoring (EHM), work release, substance or 
mental health treatment, and maintenance of employment or school, to 
name a few." Such requirements are frequently imposed as a matter of 
course on defendants (including those in no-bail jurisdictions), and they 
range in terms of both the obligation they entail and the collateral 
Finally, despite early allegiance to bail reform, California ultimately abandoned its bail 
reform provisions. See, e.g., Dan Walters, A Strange Bedfellows Alliance on BailReform Repeal 
in California,ORANGE CNTY. REG. (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.ocregister.com/2020/02/20/a-
strange-bedfellows-alliance-on-bail-reform-repeal-in-california; Julia Wick, Newsletter: The 
Future of Cash Bail in California, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020, 5:30 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-01-24/cash-bail-boudin-san-francisco-newsletter 
[https://perma.cc/FS8S-DKDC]; Jazmine Ulloa, California'sHistoric Overhaulof Cash Bail Is 
Now on Hold, Pending a 2020 Referendum, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2019, 7:25 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-bail-overhaul-referendum-20190116-story.html. 
6. See Sandra G. Mayson, Biasin, Biasout, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2222 (2019) [hereinafter 
Mayson, Bias in, Bias out]; Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. 
L. REV. 303, 344 (2018); Sandra G. Mayson, DangerousDefendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 509 
(2018) [hereinafter Mayson, DangerousDefendants];Jessica M. Eaglin, ConstructingRecidivism 
Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 61-62 (2017). 
7. See, e.g., Mayson, Biasin, Bias out, supranote 6, at 2228-30. 
8. See Melamed, supranote 5 (describing use of conditions of release in Philadelphia); 
Interview with Phila. Pub. Def. (Mar. 7, 2019) (notes on file with author); Peggy M. Tobolowsky 
& James F. Quinn, PretrialRelease in the 1990s: Texas Takes Another Look at Nonfinancial 
Release Conditions, 19 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 267, 289-90 (1993). 
9. Ironically, such nonfinancial conditions of release were originally developed during 
earlier waves of bail reform in an effort to reduce pretrial detention. See Tobolowsky & Quinn, 
supranote 8, at 289; 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (permitting a judge to impose a variety of conditions). 
10. Professor Russell Gold has suggested reconceptualizing pretrial detention completely, 
as a kind of de facto injunctive order that denies liberty, to reign in its use. See Russell M. Gold, 
JailasInjunction, 107 GEO. L.J. 501, 507-08 (2019). 
11. See infra Section IILA. 
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consequences they threaten.1 2 Some conditions carry few additional 
obligations for a defendant. Others impose heavy burdens or are 
criminogenic (i.e., they may generate new criminal charges if violated).13 
All curtail the defendant's liberty in some way, all carry collateral 
consequences, and all rely heavily on the discretion of pretrial services 
officers,14 who monitor the defendant's compliance with conditions of 
release. 
In theory, conditions of release not only offer increased opportunities 
for release over monetary bail, but they can also be tailored to address the 
twin concerns identified by modern bail statutes-risk of flight and 
danger to the community." For example, a defendant whose alleged 
crime is driven by a substance abuse problem may pose a reduced risk of 
flight or danger to the community if she is required to participate in 
substance abuse treatment as a term of pretrial release. Further, court-
ordered efforts to address a defendant's underlying life conditions that 
may increase the likelihood of future crimes-in this hypothetical, 
substance abuse-may place her in a better position to negotiate an 
alternative disposition to her case or dismissal of the charge altogether. 
In comparison to monetary bail or pretrial detention, such conditions 
should both increase the probability of pretrial release and decrease future 
incarceration. 16 From the courts' perspective, tailored conditions of 
release carry an assurance that a defendant can enjoy pretrial liberty, be 
depended upon to return for future court dates, and live as a law-abiding 
and productive member of the community.1 7 
All of this in theory makes sense. All of this in theory imagines a 
pretrial release system that is measured, precise, and just. But the world 
of pretrial release operates outside of theory. Pretrial release conditions 
are often imposed following a remarkably brief pretrial hearing on 
12. See infra Section I.A. 
13. See Robert J. Prince, Note, A Line in the Sand: Implementing Scene ofthe Crime Stay-
Away Orders as a Condition ofPretrial Release in Community Prosecution, 92 VA. L. REv. 1899, 
1919-23 (2006) (comparing pretrial no-contact conditions to pretrial stay-away orders with 
potential constitutional infringements). 
14. This Article uses the term "pretrial services" or "pretrial services officer" throughout to 
denote the administrative agency and its employees who provide information to the court about 
the defendant prior to trial. Not every jurisdiction refers to this agency or its employees as pretrial 
services. Although different jurisdictions may use a different moniker, every jurisdiction seems 
to have some form of this agency. 
15. See Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadow lands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & 
the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1297, 1330 (2012). 
16. See Wiseman, supra note 4, at 247, 255, 263-64 (finding that monetary bail 
requirements impede the ability of individuals to procure pretrial liberty); Heaton et al., supra 
note 4, at 714 (stating individuals detained pretrial are convicted more often and commit more 
future crimes than those not detained pretrial). 
17. See Appleman, supra note 15, at 1330, 1334. 
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unrepresented efendants.18 Judges impose conditions of release in a near 
rote fashion-some utilizing a checklist 19-often with little or no 
evidence that the condition is necessary to avoid the risk or risks that fuel 
them.20 For their part, defendants may be ill-equipped, financially or 
otherwise, to comply with such conditions. For instance, the defendant 
described above may in fact benefit from drug treatment, but she also 
may be unable to comply with the court's order because she lacks the 
funds to pay for treatment and free treatment facilities are hard to come 
by. Noncompliance may place such a defendant at risk of either additional 
criminal charges or future pretrial detention." 
Bail reform movements have enjoyed terrific success, and scholars 
have done tremendous work to uncover bias in both the assessment of 
pretrial risk and the imposition of pretrial detention. Little work has been 
done, however, to address the reality of nonmonetary pretrial release 
conditions. Put simply, it is a harm that hides in plain sight for poor and 
marginalized defendants-a harm that may not only prevent pretrial 
release but may also carry devastating long-term consequences for
defendants and their communities. Such conditions are akin to imposing 
probation prior to conviction. Yet, they are often touted as a benign 
alternative to monetary bail or pretrial detention. This Article asserts that 
this perception is mistaken. In reality, conditions of release often fail to 
serve as a benevolent compromise that offers the court some assurance of 
reappearance and reduced risk, and the defendant an opportunity for 
release. In reality, the very people bail reform movements sought to serve 
are many of the same people struggling under imposed conditions of 
release. 
The reduction or eradication of monetary bail alone has not, and will 
not, ensure a fair and unbiased system of pretrial detention, nor will it 
ensure that poor and marginalized defendants will benefit from pretrial 
18. EMiLY BAZELON, CHARGED 37 (2019) (noting that pretrial detention decisions are "often 
made in a few minutes or less, based on the scant information presented early on at an arraignment 
hearing"). 
19. See, e.g., 14.5: PretrialRelease, Bond andBail, http://jec.unm.edu/manuals-resources 
/municipal-court-checklists-and-scripts/pre-trial-release-bond-and-bail-checklist [https://perma 
.cc/ZP4C-59QE] (showing a release and bail checklist for municipal judges in New Mexico); 
State of Michigan, PretrialRelease Order, https://courts.michigan.gov/Administration/SCAO/ 
Forms/courtforms/mc240.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WGR-P8EG] (showing a pretrial release order 
checklist used in Michigan); U.S. District Court, Order Setting Conditions of Release, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/aol99a.pdf [https://perma.cc/N99N-ERTB] (showing 
the federal conditions of release checklist); U.S. District Court, AdditionalConditionsofRelease, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ao199b.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PJ6-MQPL] (showing 
a federal checklist for additional conditions of relase). 
20. BAZELON, supra note 18, at 37, 39. 
21. See infra Part III. 
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release. 22 Rather, bail reform movements have largely shifted the burden 
of release from monetary bail to fees for EHM, requirements of meetings 
with pretrial services officers and counselors, submission to random drug 
testing, compliance with no-contact orders, and a myriad of other 
imposed conditions. 23 For some, the burden of such pretrial conditions is 
no less insurmountable than monetary bail. For others, conditions of 
release render a more devastating toll-generating new criminal charges 
upon violation and new periods of detention.24 To add insult to injury, 
there is precious little research into the utility of such conditions. 
The fee charged in the form of bail may be the most apparent barrier 
to release, but it is not the only one. To shift the pretrial paradigm away 
from detention therefore requires addressing not only the most apparent 
barrier, but all barriers that promote pretrial incarceration and impose 
unjustified burdens on defendants awaiting trial, including non-monetary 
conditions of release that promote detention and for some re-arrest. This 
is not to say that courts may never set conditions of release or that they 
should disregard all risk factors or concerns at the pretrial stage. It is to 
say that the current pretrial detention regime is problematic because it 
carries too much risk of bias and arbitrariness, despite a lack of evidence 
linking the imposed conditions to the mitigation of perceived risks. 
This argument unfolds in three parts. Part I considers the framework 
of the pretrial release system-both as a constitutional and statutory 
matter. Both construct a system premised on the notion that pretrial 
release should be the norm and that detention or conditions of release 
monetary or otherwise-are appropriate only when they promote a 
compelling and articulated state interest.25 Part II turns to the question of 
how modern courts determine when or if pretrial conditions or detention 
is necessary. Charging decisions, risk assessment tools, and institutional 
discretion all drive such determinations, and each raises real bias 
concerns. Finally, Part III considers the realities of pretrial release, 
including the most common conditions of release, the collateral 
consequences they carry both for compliance and noncompliance, the 
role of pretrial services officers' discretion in determining compliance, 
and the route forward for reform. 
Despite tremendous work and reform in the pretrial detention arena, 
relatively little attention has been paid to the reality that courts impose 
criminogenic and burdensome conditions on defendants with little to no 
22. See infraPart III. 
23. See infraPart III. 
24. See infraPart III. 
25. Modem bail statutes describe these as prevention of flight and danger to the community. 
Eg., FLA. STAT. § 903.046(1) (2020) ("The purpose of a bail determination in criminal 
proceedings is to ensure the appearance of the criminal defendant at subsequent proceedings and 
to protect the community against unreasonable danger from the criminal defendant."). 
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demonstration that such conditions accomplish the state's articulated 
goals. This is puzzling. Not only does the imposition of such conditions 
depend on systems and individuals that are plagued with potential bias, 
but the lack of evidence that such conditions either increase release rates 
or affect articulated risks also raises questions about their conformity with 
constitutional and statutory mandates or indeed their basic utility. The on-
the-ground reality of such conditions is often a series of devastating 
impacts on defendants and their communities2-impacts that undermine 
pretrial reform efforts and thus deserve attention. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF BAIL 
Constitutional and statutory mandates govern pretrial conditions of 
release. Both rely on the notion that, prior to conviction, a defendant is 
entitled to release absent some evidence that she poses a risk that cannot 
be mitigated. Uniformly, modern statutes define relevant risks as flight 
and danger to the community. As a constitutional matter, pretrial 
conditions have been challenged under both the Excessive Bail and Due 
Process Clauses, and as an equal protection violation. Despite these 
challenges, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has set few limitations on 
pretrial conditions-monetary or otherwise. 
Pretrial conditions may not act as punishment. Determining whether 
pretrial conditions are punitive requires examining the link between the 
proposed condition and the state's articulated interests as identified by 
bail statutes.2 8 Pretrial conditions that are not necessary to promote the 
state's interest or, more accurately, that exceed what is necessary to guard 
against the risk the state has identified, are deemed excessive and may 
violate the defendant's substantive due process rights. 29 Whatever 
26. This Article focuses on the impacts of nonmonetary conditions on defendants and their 
communities. Other impacts are borne by the state, particularly if defendants cannot comply with 
conditions and are either never released from pretrial custody or are detained upon violation of a 
condition of release. When this occurs, the state bears the monetary cost of this incarceration. 
Pretrial detention also raises well-founded concerns regarding overincarceration of defendants 
pretrial. The decision not to focus on such costs in this Article does not reflect a normative 
judgment regarding such costs but rather reflects the reality thatother scholars have documented 
this phenomenon well in the context of monetary bail. See generally, e.g., Heaton et al., supra 
note 4. 
27. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 
535 (1979) (holding that pretrial detention may not be punitive). 
28. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 405 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]f the 
condition of confinement being challenged 'is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal-if it is 
arbitrary or purposeless-a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental 
action is punishment."' (quoting Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539)). 
29. See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754 ("The only arguable substantive limitation of the Bail 
Clause is that the Government's proposed conditions of release or detention not be 'excessive' in 
light of the perceived evil."). 
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procedural due process is required in the pretrial setting seems to be 
constitutionally sufficient so long as it permits the lower court to 
determine that a nexus exists between the state's compelling interests and 
the restrictions on the accused's liberty.30 
This overlapping analysis between what is excessive under the Eighth 
Amendment's Excessive Bail Clause, and what process is required to 
impose a condition under procedural and substantive due process 
requirements, has left a limited due process standardfor pretrial detention 
hearings in its wake. Procedurally, the Court has declined to require many 
trial-based safeguards, holding instead that the pretrial process is 
sufficient so long as it establishes the required nexus between the state's 
compelling interests and the pretrial condition. And lower courts have 
been reluctant to revive the substantive due process analysis the Court 
utilized in Salerno, even as they conclude that compelling liberty interests 
are at stake.31 Equal protection challenges to pretrial detention and 
conditions have largely met a similar response, with lower courts 
concluding that even with a protected class established, a constitutional 
violation occurs only if the condition imposed exceeds that necessary to 
maintain the state's interest.32 
As limited and circular as this constitutional framework may appear, 
understanding it is critical to an analysis of the pretrial detention system. 
The bail reform movement has used this framework to argue against 
monetary bail, both as biased against poor and minority defendants and 
as lacking a critical link with the state's articulated goals of reappearance 
and safety. As discussed below, similar assertions can be made for 
nonmonetary conditions of release. 
30. See id. at 752. 
31. See Jenny E. Carroll, The Due Process of Bail, WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 
2021). 
32. See, e.g., ODonnellv. Harris Cnty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1140 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff'd 
as modified, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018). In ODonnell, the court recognized an equal protection 
claim based on economic class but nonetheless engaged in a due process analysis with regard to 
the constitutional violation, again linking the violation to the process bail hearings afforded in 
establishing conditions linked to the state's articulated goals as opposed to the class 
characteristics. Id. at 1135; see also Carroll, supra note 31. 
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A. The Excessive BailClause, Due Process, andEqualProtection 
The Constitution mentions bail only once 33 and does not mention 
pretrial conditions of release at all-though nonmonetary conditions of 
release were common at the time of the Founding and beyond.34 The 
Eighth Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." 35 
Even at the time of its adoption, the Excessive Bail Clause carried an 
imprecise meaning. One delegate in the House of Representatives 
commented that "[t]he clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, 
on which account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no 
meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. What is meant by the terms 
excessive bail? Who are to be the judges?" 36 As Professor Samuel 
Wiseman has noted, the Excessive Bail Clause's "complex and obscure 
history ... has made consensus over the precise function of the 
constitutional prohibition against excessive bail elusive." 37 
33. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The constitutional focus on trial versus pretrial rights is likely 
a product of the pretrial release system at the time of the founding-one grounded in an English 
common law and constitutional system that required bail determinations to be made in a timely 
fashion, in open court, and based on evidentiary record. See Caleb Foote, The Coming 
ConstitutionalCrisisin Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 966 (1965) (discussing pretrial bail under 
English common law in the seventeenth century); William F. Duker, The Right to Bail: A 
HistoricalInquiry, 42 ALB. L. REV. 33, 34-66 (1977) (tracing the development of pretrial release 
procedures in Anglo-American law); Note, Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 
966, 966-77 (1961) (connecting modern American bail practices to the development of bond in 
pre-Norman England and suggesting reforms). Even before the founding, colonial bail systems 
disfavored pretrial detention and bail. See Foote, supra, at 975 (describing the 1641 practice in 
Massachusetts rendering all noncapital cases bailable); June Carbone, Seeing Through the 
Emperor's New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 531 (1983) (describing the colonial Pennsylvania constitution that 
presumed bail and provided process rights pretrial); Matthew J. Hegreness, America's 
FundamentalndVanishingRight to Bail, 55 ARiZ. L. REV. 909, 920 (2013) (noting the influence 
of the Pennsylvania Frame of Government on federal and state bail practices). Finally, the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 followed colonial practice, permitting bail in all noncapital charges and 
allowing pretrial detention only in the absence of a suitable alternative condition of release. ch. 
20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91. 
34. See Timothy R. Schnacke, A BriefHistory ofBail, JUDGES' J., Summer 2018, at 4, 6 
(describing historical reliance on nonfinancial conditions of release in lieu of monetary bail to 
assure the defendant's presence). 
35. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
36. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Samuel 
Livermore). Part of the reluctance to include such a clause may have stemmed from the well-
established principle surrounding pretrial release dating back to the Magna Carta and present in 
colonial America. See sources cited supra note 33. 
37. SamuelWiseman,Discrimination,Coercion, andthe BailReform Act of]984: The Loss 
ofthe Core ConstitutionalProtectionsofthe Excessive Bail Clause, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 121, 
130 (2009). 
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For its part, the Supreme Court has devoted precious little attention to 
the Excessive Bail Clause-entangling the evaluation of excessiveness in 
38 due process and equal protection 39 analyses. Early cases defined 
excessiveness in terms of the underlying function of bail-the assurance 
of the defendant's reappearance before the court-and the court's ability 
to tailor conditions of release to that goal. 40 In this, the constitutional 
requirement-that bail not be excessive-was met by a sort of circular 
logic. Bail was not excessive provided a court could determine that 
whatever condition was imposed promoted the state's articulated 
purpose. In turn, whatever process might be due a defendant during a 
pretrial detention hearing was limited to that necessary to establish the 
nexus between the state's interests and pretrial release conditions. 41 Equal 
protection claims suffer a similarly retrospective (and circular) analysis, 
with courts concluding that equal protection concerns are satisfied 
provided that the deprivation of liberty is tailored to address the state's 
42articulated concerns. 
Modern cases have maintained this interdependent construct of state 
interests and due process and equal protection. In Stack v. Boyle,43 the 
Court drew a historical arc between modern bail and the historic basis of 
bail.44 Specifically, the Court wrote that "the deposit of a sum of money 
38. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
40. See Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704, 710 (1835) (noting that bail should be set 
in a manner to accomplish its purpose to "compel[] the party to submit to the trial and 
punishment"); Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895) (holding that prior to conviction a 
defendant should be released or granted bail sufficient to ensure his return to court). These 
holdings are consistent with the post-Colonial perception of bail both as a default position (as 
opposed to detention) and as a mere means to prevent flight, as well as the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
which indicated "bail shall be admitted, except where the punishment may be death." ch. 20, § 33, 
1 Stat. 73, 91. 
41. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) ("Since the function of bail is limited, the 
fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose 
of assuring the presence of that defendant."); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) 
("[T]he Government's general interest in preventing crime . . . is heightened when the 
Government musters convincing proof that the arrestee ... presents a demonstrable danger to the 
community."); United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 716-17 (1990) (recognizing that 
a defendant's liberty interest is "vital" and requires a prompt hearing on pretrial release but stating 
that errors in timing do not grant a defendant a remedy of release). 
42. See, e.g., Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) ("The 
ultimate inquiry in each instance is what is necessary to reasonably assure defendant's presence 
at trial."). 
43. 342 U.S. 1 (1951). 
44. See id. at 5. 
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subject to forfeiture serves as additional assurance of the presence of an 
accused." 45 
The Court continued, "Bail set at a figure higher than an amount 
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is 'excessive' under the 
Eighth Amendment." 46 In this, the Court defined excessiveness not in 
terms of whether a defendant could afford the bail but rather in the bail's 
ability to accomplish the state's goals. 4 7 This, in turn, tied the calculation 
of excessiveness to the process due a defendant.48 While the Stack Court 
offered little insight into the precise parameters of either pretrial flight 
risk or sufficient process, the Court concluded that some process was 
necessary to prevent bail from becoming "punishment prior to 
conviction." 49 Ultimately, the Court concluded that whatever form that 
process took must be sufficient to link the deprivation of liberty in 
question to the risk articulated by the state. 50 In Stack, the bail was not 
excessive so long as the lower court determined that the bail set served to 
reduce the risk that the defendant would fail to appear at trial. 1 
Thirty-six years later, in UnitedStates v. Salerno,52 the Court returned 
to the question of the constitutionality of pretrial detention, this time in 
the context of the Bail Reform Act of 1984.53 Salerno, a reputed crime 
boss, brought a facial challenge to the preventive detention provisions of 
the Act. 54 The Court, in upholding the Act, again relied on an entwined 
analysis of the Excessive Bail and Due Process Clauses-this time in the 
context of substantive due process. 5 Finding that the novel detention 
provisions of the Act were both regulatory and reasonable, as they 
furthered the government's legitimate interest in the safety of the 
community, 56 the Court again linked the meaning of "excessive" to the 
underlying function of bail itself-this time in terms of dangerousness as 
opposed to flight risk.57 Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote, 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. See id. 
48. Id. at 4 (linking determination of eligibility for bail to the defendant's due process 
rights). 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 5. 
51. Id. (holding that due process is sufficient so long as the fixing of bail is "based upon 
standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant"). 
52. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
53. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§3141-50, 3162); 
see Salerno,481 U.S. at 741. 
54. Salerno,481 U.S. at 743, 746-49. 
55. Id. at 746-49. 
56. Id. at 750-52. 
57. Id. at 753-55. 
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The only arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause 
is that the Government's proposed conditions of release or 
detention not be 'excessive' in light of the perceived 
evil.... [T]o determine whether the Government's response 
is excessive, we must compare that response against the 
interest the Government seeks to protect by means of that 
response.58 
The Court held, as it did in Stack, that defendants were only entitled to 
sufficient process to demonstrate that the deprivation of liberty could 
survive the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive bail. 59 
The Court in Salerno was clear-the imposition of bail or, in Salerno's 
case, pretrial detention, requires proof "by clear and convincing evidence 
that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat."6 0 Without 
such proof, any effort to curtail the defendant's liberty pretrial is not only 
excessive but also violates the level of process required by the Fifth 
Amendment.61 
In both cases, as it has at times in other Eighth Amendment arenas,62 
the Court declined to provide either a clear definition of excessive or the 
precise procedural mechanisms due a defendant in a pretrial detention 
consideration. Instead, the Court reiterated the position it had staked out 
in Stack, relying on the Due Process Clause to hold that the calculation 
of excessiveness was an individualized analysis based on the defendant's 
own characteristics-whether as to flight risk in Stack or dangerousness 
in Salerno-andthe interests the government sought to protect.63 Bail was 
rendered excessive when it exceeded what was necessary to achieve 
legitimate state interests. As Professor Lauryn Gouldin has noted in the 
context of monetary bail, "Read together, these decisions support the 
58. Id. at 754. 
59. Id. at 750-51. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 746-55. 
62. Consider, for example, the Court's interpretation of "cruel and unusual punishment" in 
the Eighth Amendment, under which bright-line rules have emerged only for the most extreme 
sentences. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (prohibiting the execution of 
individuals with diminished intellectual abilities); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) 
(prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) 
(prohibiting life without parole sentences for nonhomicide juvenile offenders). 
63. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754-55 ("Thus, when the Government has admitted that its 
only interest is in preventing flight, bail must be set by a court at a sum designed to ensure that 
goal and no more. We believe that when Congress has mandated detention on the basis of a 
compelling interest other than prevention of flight, as it has here, the Eighth Amendment does not 
require release on bail." (internal citation omitted) (citing Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951)); 
Stack, 342 U.S. at 5 ("Since the function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual 
defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that 
defendant."). 
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claim that pretrial restrictions on liberty that are not tailored to the 
specific risk an arrestee presents are unconstitutionally 'excessive."' 64 
The Court's failure to draw a bright-line rule regarding "excessive 
bail" and the corresponding process may be a product of the nature of 
pretrial detention itself-or at least the Court's vision of it. First, the 
Court's construction of the process due a defendant pretrial rests on an 
embedded understanding that the purpose of pretrial detention is limited 
to achieving articulated state goals of reappearance for trial and safety 
through imposed conditions. While such concerns are certainly 
important, focus on these twin risks is also problematic. It seems to ignore 
the well-documented impact of pretrial detention decisions on defendants 
and the larger community.65 This, in turn, raises questions regarding how 
these risks are defined and who should define them. As discussed in the 
context of risk assessment tools, the calculations of safety or even flight 
risk are, by their nature, fraught with the potential for perspective bias. 
The decision to detain a defendant pretrial, or to impose restrictive 
conditions, may appear necessary to a court or pretrial assessment officer 
to ensure safety but may nonetheless run contrary to community notions 
of safety. To the people who know and depend on the defendant in all 
sorts of ways, pretrial detention or pretrial release conditions may create 
gaps in social, familial, and economic networks. Scholars and community 
groups alike have highlighted and lamented the downstream 
consequences of pretrial detention, 66 but they have less vigorously 
explored questions about how risks are defined. 
Beyond this, the pursuit of these state-articulated pretrial goals seems 
an odd justification for the Court's failure to attach procedural protections 
to pretrial hearings, particularly in light of the Court's requirement of 
such protections in other pretrial contexts. 67 It is difficult to imagine that 
the benefits and necessity of counsel for a defendant in a probable cause 
hearing, for example, are any less urgent or required in a pretrial detention 
64. See Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining FlightRisk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 699-700 (2018). 
65. See Will Dobbie et al., The Effects ofPretrialDetention on Conviction, Future Crime, 
andEmployment: Evidencefrom Randomly AssignedJudges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 224-26, 
224 tbl.4 (2018); Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 741-59; CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., THE 
HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 3 (2013). 
66. See, e.g., Wiseman, supranote 4, at 239-44; Heaton et al., supranote 4, at 713-14. 
67. See, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 212, 213 (2008) (requiring the 
appointment of counsel in all critical phases of the criminal justice process); Brewer v. Williams, 
430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977) (requiring the appointment of counsel at the defendant's firstjudicial 
hearing in which he is formally informed of charges against him); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 
126 (1975) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of probable cause 
as a prerequisite to detention."); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 58-59 (1991) 
(interpreting Gerstein'srequirement of a "prompt" judicial determination of probable cause to be 
forty-eight hours). 
2021] BEYOND BAIL 157 
hearing."8 Certainly, the Court's conclusion that such procedural 
safeguards are not required in pretrial detention hearings because any 
resulting deprivation of liberty is regulatory and not punitive 69 may feel 
like a mere semantic distinction to defendants sitting in jail awaiting trial 
or facing other restrictions. 
Second, the Court has noted that pretrial detention, because it serves 
these limited goals, is distinct from punishments meted out after 
conviction and therefore requires a distinct procedure. 70 As discussed in 
more detail below, this distinction presents itself in several ways. For the 
Court's constitutional analysis, however, the most significant is that 
pretrial conditions-monetary or otherwise-are limited to the pretrial 
period. The Court seems to accept that this period is shorter than periods 
of punishment-a contested proposition to be sure. Other distinctions 
that pretrial conditions are imposed early in the criminal process or that 
the deprivations of liberty in question, particularly in cases of release on 
conditions or bail, are less significant and therefore require less rigorous 
procedural protections-both seem to overlook the significant impact of 
pretrial conditions.71 
In the end, pretrial decisions are, by their very nature, efforts to predict 
some future occurrence based on limited data. An individual defendant 
may present particular risks or may be a particularly safe bet in ways that 
are not readily apparent. Unlike sentencing, which carries its own 
predictive burdens, pretrial release conditions are not punitive. Therefore, 
they cannot be justified based on a desire to punish a defendant prior to 
conviction. In this, the Court's allegiance to a process based on an 
individualized analysis of the defendant in comparison to the state's 
articulated goals may be grounded in the recognition that courts must 
have some flexibility to make early decisions with limited information. 
Faced with little guidance as to precisely what process is necessary in the 
pretrial detention arena, states have increasingly constructed their own 
bright-line rules-usually dictated by the charged offense, the 
defendant's criminal history, information that suggests a likelihood to 
succumb to the identified risks of flight or future danger, or a combination 
of all three factors.72 In the alternative, states have gravitated toward risk 
assessment ools that diminish discretionary decision-making and, in 
68. See Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213; Gerstein,420 U.S. at 126. 
69. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 541-46 (1979) (holding that conditions of pretrial 
release were not punitive as they promoted legitimate state interests for finite periods of time). 
70. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (noting that pretrial detention is distinct 
from punishment and therefore some procedural protections available at trial were not required). 
71. See infra Part III. 
72. See infra Section I.B. 
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some cases, eliminate a defendant interview.7 3 Even in cases where no 
bright-line rule is applied, pretrial conditions of release, monetary and 
otherwise, are often imposed routinely or based on set schedules. 74 
For their part, equal protection challenges have focused on the 
unaffordability of bail, arguing that bail amounts have a disparate impact 
on poor and minority defendants. Like their due process counterparts, 
these challenges claim that unaffordable bail violates the Equal 
Protection Clause absent some demonstration that the bail is the least 
restrictive means to satisfy the compelling state interest.75 
Despite the limited process standards articulated by the courts, reform 
efforts have succeeded in shifting the modern pretrial release system 
increasingly away from monetary conditions toward nonmonetary 
conditions. 76 They have often done so with the blessing and help of 
elected prosecutors. 77 These nonmonetary conditions, however, may 
create equal, if not greater, burdens for the very populations such reforms 
sought to protect.78 The price of release for defendants, particularly those 
charged with minor offenses who appear to present a low pretrial release 
risk, may no longer be monetary bail, but might instead be agreed-upon 
conditions of release that may have little to do with any risk the defendant 
may pose or any compelling state interest.79 Such conditions may not only 
carry a financial burden but may also impose far-reaching consequences 
for defendants, their families, and their communities. 80 
B. Statutory RegulationofRelease 
The constitutional ideals embodied in the Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments and articulated by the Court take tangible form 
in state and federal rules and statutes regulating pretrial release. In federal 
court, the Bail Reform Act sets pretrial release as a "default" unless the 
judge "determines that such release will not reasonably assure the 
appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any 
73. See infra Section I.B. 
74. See infra Section I.B. 
75. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that bail should be 
narrowly tailored to ensure the accused's presence at trial); ODonnell v. Harris Cnty., 892 F.3d 
147, 162 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that the monetary bail for a misdemeanor was not narrowly 
tailored to ensuring accused's appearance); Brangan v. Commonwealth, 80 N.E.3d 949, 959 
(Mass. 2017) (holding that unaffordable bail is subject to certain due process requirements); Lee 
v. Lawson, 375 So. 2d 1019, 1023 (Miss. 1979) (explaining that the method and amount of bail 
should be relevant to ensuring accused's appearance at trial). 
76. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
77. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
78. See infra Section IIIB. 
79. See infra Section I.A. 
80. See infra Section I.A. 
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other person or the community."81 While there is statutory variance 
among states and between the state and federal systems, the twin concerns 
of flight risk and future dangerousness are consistent. 82 Likewise, the 
procedural requirements that the court first determine the level of risk the 
defendant poses and second craft conditions of release-monetary or 
otherwise-that answer those concerns are constants among such 
statutes, whether state or federal. 83 
Under the Bail Reform Act, if the government or the court seeks to 
hold a defendant prior to trial, the court must conduct a hearing to 
determine the defendant's level of risk and the conditions, if any, that will 
ameliorate that risk.8 4 States have followed suit.8 5 Scholars and activists, 
however, have criticized such pretrial detention hearings as being 
notoriously cursory or, with increased use of risk assessment tools and 
some bail reform, nonexistent.86 In addition, while state statutes may still 
require or permit some level of judicial discretion with regard to pretrial 
release, that discretion appears increasingly formulaic at best and capable 
of producing inconsistent and biased results at worst.87 
While these critiques of pretrial hearings raise significant concerns, as 
discussed above, limitations in process may be a product of the nature of 
the pretrial inquiry itself.88 Pretrial detention hearings are by their nature 
81. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). While 18 U.S.C. § 3142 and § 3144 govern release prior to trial, 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(b) permits a judge to add additional conditions of release 
during trial. Id. §§ 3142, 3144; FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(b). 
82. See SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK 3-4 (2018); Gouldin, supranote 
64, at 701. 
83. See § 3142; sources cited supranote 82. Admittedly, these labels may be deceptive and 
may at times flow into one another-with dangerousness judged in terms of flight risk and flight 
risk in terms of dangerousness. See Gouldin, supranote 64, at 701. However, these are the distinct 
interests identified by the statutes. Id. 
84. § 3142(e)(1). 
85. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 82, at 40-41 (discussing hearings in various state 
jurisdictions). See generally PATRICK LIU ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF BAIL AND PRETRIAL 
DETENTION (2018) (providing an overview of state pretrial detention processes). 
86. See Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 6, at 509-10 (describing the 
streamlining of pretrial detention hearings through the use of risk assessment tools producing 
cursory hearings, or in some cases, no hearings); Eaglin, supra note 6, at 61-64. In jurisdictions 
such as Philadelphia or New Jersey, both of which have implemented bail reforms eradicating 
monetary bail in all or some cases, some pretrial review hearings have vanished altogether as 
defendants are either released on agreements signed by the prosecutor and the defendant or the 
court holds a minimal uncontested hearing. See supra note 5. 
87. See Stevenson, supra note 6, at 314-17 (discussing the formulaic approach to risk 
assessment). 
88. See United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1479 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that pretrial 
hearings are not designed to "rehash ... probable cause" but to allow the defendant to demonstrate 
that he poses no flight risk or danger to the community); United States v. Smith, 79 F.3d 1208, 
1210 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (noting that a requirement of full litigation of the pending case 
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predictive and often occur very early in a case before the defense has 
enjoyed a meaningful opportunity to investigate or challenge the 
prosecution's case. 89 In state courts, they may occur before counsel is 
even appointed. 90 Therefore, such hearings often cannot, as a practical 
matter, result in any meaningful refutation of the allegations.91 This is not 
to say that defendants cannot or do not challenge the existence of 
probable cause. 92 But such a challenge is even more of an uphill battle 
for the defense pretrial than at trial.93 The prosecutor is heavily 
advantaged at this stage of the case and at times uses that advantage to 
urge pretrial detention-asking courts to consider the weight of evidence 
against the defendant as a reason to "hold" the defendant or to impose 
strict conditions of release pretrial. 94 Judges themselves are risk-averse 
regarding release, often erring towards detention or conditions rather than 
risking bad publicity.95 
Beyond this, the sheer volume of cases that arraignment courts must 
process on a daily basis, coupled with the promulgation of increasingly 
at a pretrial hearing would not only complicate the hearing but also would be "out of proportion 
to the liberty interest at stake-viz. the interest in remaining free until trial, for what is by statute 
a period of limited duration"). 
89. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2), for example, requires a pretrial detention hearing immediately 
following a defendant's first appearance, but it also permits a three-day delay of the hearing on 
motion of the government's attorney, or the defendant can request a five-day delay for good cause. 
§ 3142(f)(2). Often the hearing is delayed to allow the defendant to acquire counsel. See id Once 
the hearing occurs, however, § 3142(f)(2) does not permit either the government or the defendant 
to reopen the detention question unless new evidence that was not known at the time of the initial 
hearing becomes available. Id; see also BAZELON, supranote 18, at 37 (asserting that prosecutors 
rely on facts in the arrest warrant to reduce the defendant to the police account of what the 
defendant did wrong). 
90. See Pamela R. Metzger & Janet C. Hoeffel, Criminal (Dis)Appearance,88 GEo. WASH. 
L. REV. 392, 405-06 (2020). 
91. See BAZELON, supranote 18, at 37; Appleman, supranote 15, at 1354-55. 
92. Gerstein v. Pugh held that a probable cause hearing must occur either before or 
promptly after the defendant is arrested and charged by information (as opposed to by indictment). 
420 U.S. 103, 124-25 (1975). County of Riverside v. McLaughlin held that this probable cause 
hearing must occur within forty-eight hours of the defendant's arrest. 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). It 
is not unusual to hold the pretrial detention hearing immediately following the probable cause 
hearing-assuming probable cause is found. Even if the state charges the defendant by indictment, 
a defendant may challenge the probable cause of the indictment, though may not choose to do so 
at a pretrial detention hearing. 
93. See BAZELON, supranote 18, at 37; Appleman, supranote 15, at 1354. 
94. See BAZELON, supranote 18, at 37; Appleman, supra note 15, at 1331. Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 46 permits consideration of the facts alleged in the case, and § 3142(g) of the 
Bail Reform Act allows consideration of the crime alleged in determining flight risk, danger to 
the community, and the appropriate conditions of release. § 3142(g); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 46. 
95. Gouldin, supra note 64, at 680-81. Recently proposed bail statutes underscore this 
aversion as state legislators contract bail considerations. See, e.g., H.B. 81, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Ala. 2020) (seeking to expand the ability of courts to make "no bail" findings). 
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sophisticated assessment tools and strong pretrial detention reform 
movements (fueled in no small part by a growing distrust of judicial 
discretion), counsels toward limited or, in some cases, nonexistent 
pretrial detention hearings.9 6 In response, states have implemented risk 
assessment tools, 97 altered factors for considering bail or conditions of 
release,98 and, in some cases, considered eliminating monetary bail.99 
Each of these has streamlined the pretrial detention process-reducing 
hearings or eliminating them altogether and curtailing already limited 
pretrial procedural protections. 
Regardless of the length of the hearing, or if one occurs at all, 
defendants generally face a limited universe of outcomes following a 
charge. Like its state analogs, the Bail Reform Act provides that "[u]pon 
the appearance before a judicial officer of a person charged with an 
offense, the judicial officer shall issue an order that, pending trial, the 
person be" 100 placed into one of four categories: 
(1) released on personal recognizance or . . . an unsecured 
appearance bond . ;1.. 
(2) released on a condition or ... conditions ... ;102 
96. In conversations between the Author and defense counsel, some practitioners reported 
that first appearance or arraignment judges and prosecutors in their jurisdictions "determine" 
terms of pretrial release prior to the "hearing." Defendants, often appearing without appointed 
counsel, are "told" whether they will be released pretrial and under what terms. Thus, while a 
hearing "technically" occurs, it is a nonsubstantive one. 
97. See Mayson, DangerousDefendants, supranote 6, at 492-97 (describing a variety of 
risk assessment tools adopted in the wake of the bail reform movement); Eaglin, supra note 6, at 
61-62 (describing widespread use of risk assessment algorithm tools in pretrial detention 
hearings). 
98. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 82, at 40-41 (describing the adoption of different bail 
factors in new and proposed state legislation). 
99. See, e.g., In re Ariz. Code of Jud. Admin. § 5-201, No. 2014-12 (Ariz. Jan. 10, 2014); 
Melamed, supra note 5 (describing the decision of Philadelphia DA Larry Krasner to forgo 
monetary bail for low-level and nonviolent offenses). It is worth noting that Krasner has come 
under criticism recently for failing to adhere to his own bail reform policies-citing concerns 
about safety to the community to justify requests for bail and detention for low-level and 
nonviolent offenses. See Covert, supranote 5. In 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced a bill 
to prohibit cash bail in federal cases. See S. 3271, 115th Cong. (2018). Represenative Ted Lieu 
introduced a corresponding house resolution in 2019. See H.R. 4474, 116th Cong. (2019). The 
bill, however, is still just a bill, not a law. See generally School House Rock, I'm just a bill, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FFroMQKiag [https://perma.cc/XU2J-WXXT] (explaining 
how a bill becomes a law). 
100. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a). 
101. Id. § 3142(a)(1); see id. § 3142(b). 
102. Id. § 3142(a)(2); see id. § 3142(c). 
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(3) temporarily detained to permit revocation of conditional 
release, deportation, or exclusion ... ; 103 or 
(4) detained .... 1 4 
Jurisdictions that have eliminated monetary bail requirements may 
forgo the pretrial detention hearing-permitting a defendant to be 
released upon agreement of the parties without ever appearing before a 
judge.105 If a hearing is conducted, the court may rely on information 
gathered by pretrial services and, in jurisdictions with risk assessment 
tools, risk scores generated by such tools.106 
Setting aside the category of defendants who are detained so that a 
prior release may be revoked or modified or so that they may be deported 
or excluded (category 3 above)-who are beyond the scope of this 
Article-the court considers a limited range of information in 
determining whether to release a defendant and how that release should 
present. For example, § 3142(g) of the Bail Reform Act requires the 
judicial officer to consider the nature and circumstances of the crime; 107 
the weight of the evidence; the nature and seriousness of danger the 
release of the defendant presents; and the criminal and social history of 
the defendant. 108 This last category, the defendant's criminal and social 
history, is by far the broadest. This category permits the judge to consider 
the defendant's criminal history (including past arrests, convictions, and 
whether the defendant was on probation, parole, or other release pending 
trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense) and 
social history (including the defendant's mental and physical condition, 
familial ties, employment, education, financial resources, ties to the 
community, drug or alcohol abuse, and record of past court 
appearances). 109 In theory, risk assessment tools consider these factors in 
generating a risk score.110 Even in jurisdictions in which risk assessment 
103. Id. § 3142(a)(3); see id. § 3142(d). 
104. Id. § 3142(a)(4); see id. § 3142(e). 
105. See e.g., Melamed, supra note 5 (describing the practice in Philadelphia). 
106. See BAUGHMAN, supranote 82, at 40-41. 18 U.S.C. § 3154(1) allows pretrial services 
to collect information and make recommendations to the court regarding release, detention, and 
any appropriate conditions in between. See § 3154(1). Section 3141(a) grants the court, or other 
judicial officers, the authority to release or detain defendants. Id. § 3141(a). For a state court 
example, see Stevenson, supranote 6, at 342-46 (describing the practice in Kentucky). 
107. This may include whether the crime was violent or had an aggravating factor such as 
narcotics or a weapon, involved racial animus, or the defendant had a domestic relationship with 
the alleged victim. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1). 
108. Id. § 3142(g). 
109. Id. § 3142(g)(3). 
110. See infraPartII. 
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tools are used, courts may still rely on pretrial services to generate a report 
and to make recommendations regarding pretrial release or detention.i 
As noted previously, the presumption under modern bail statutes is 
that in all but a very limited number of circumstances the defendant 
should be released either on her own recognizance, on monetary bail, or 
on some condition or conditions of release. For bail or conditions of 
release, the court must impose only those conditions necessary to mitigate 
whatever risk the defendant poses.11 2 The prosecution must demonstrate 
that such conditions are necessary by articulating a theory of risk-flight 
or danger to the community-before the court will even consider holding 
a defendant or imposing some conditions on his liberty.1 1 3 Despite this 
requirement, there have been few (if any) studies on what effects any 
particular condition has on either the defendant's probability of 
appearance or her risk of future dangerousness. Instead, it appears that 
the Court's requirement that pretrial conditions be linked to state goals is 
met when the state articulates its concern and requests to impose a 
condition. In reality, little to no consideration of the condition's 
probability of success in mitigating the risk it purports to address is 
constitutionally necessary. 
As a result, despite the default position of release and the required 
demonstration of necessity to trigger pretrial conditions of release, both 
conditions and pretrial detention remain common, even as bail 
requirements recede. Even a defendant released on her own recognizance 
is required to agree to attend all future court proceedings and to not 
commit any new offenses in any jurisdiction as a condition of the release 
(conditions, incidentally, a defendant is already required to comply with 
under other sections of the criminal code).1 1 4 Like bail, conditions of 
release can carry far-reaching consequences for the defendant and her 
community.1 1 5 Yet, such conditions are routinely imposed either by 
agreement or as a result of a cursory hearing with little attention paid to 
their impact or to whether they accomplish their purported goals. 
Defendants released on conditions are routinely characterized as being 
set free-as opposed to detained or released on bail. However, such 
conditions may do as much as, or even sometimes more than, monetary 
bail in terms of restricting the defendant's current and future liberty. 
111. See Stevenson, supra note 6, at 345. 
112. See § 3142(f); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) ("In our society liberty 
is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception."). 
113. See § 3142(f); United States v. Butler, 165 F.R.D. 68, 71 (N.D. Ohio 1996) ("When 
there exists one or more grounds for holding a hearing . . . the government may proceed on the 
theory of risk of flight and/or danger to the community or any other person."). 
114. See § 3142(b). 
115. See infraPart III. 
164 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
C. The Takeaway 
Before turning to other aspects of pretrial release conditions, it is 
worth noting a significant commonality in both the constitutional and 
statutory aspects of pretrial release. For as little as the Supreme Court has 
weighed in on the constitutionality of pretrial release, it has maintained 
that imposition of a condition of release may not be arbitrary.116 The 
Excessive Bail, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses require that 
there must be some underlying risk that the state seeks to mitigate through 
the infringement of liberty it seeks to impose-whether that be preventive 
detention in the case of Tony Salerno, monetary bail in the case of Loretta 
Stack, or something in between.11 7 
State and federal statutes echo this constitutional requirement, using 
pretrial release as a baseline that can be altered only upon a finding that 
some condition is necessary to protect the twin interests of reappearance 
and community safety. 1"' Risk assessment tools and pretrial detention 
reform movements both purport a desire to get his balance "right"-to 
ensure that defendants are released absent some demonstration that 
concerns of flight risk or safety exist and are restrained in some way if 
such concerns are present. 119 Put another way, risk assessment tools and 
pretrial detention reform movements, together, seek to fulfill the function 
of the pretrial release process-to ensure the defendant's liberty while 
protecting both the judicial process and the community at large. 
The difficulty, however, is that they only get this balance half right. 
As discussed in Part II, risk assessment tools may remove much judicially 
initiated bias, and reform movements have shed light on the regressive 
practices of pretrial detention-particularly in the context of monetary 
bail and bias. Yet, each has done little to demand the fulfillment of the 
second half of the constitutional equation the Court articulated-the 
demonstration that conditions actually serve some articulated purpose 
and are not imposed arbitrarily or merely for the sake of curtailing the 
defendant's liberty as she awaits trial. As a result, even as prosecutors 
and courts have backed away from the imposition of monetary bail in 
low-level cases, they continue to impose nonmonetary conditions, which 
can have an equally devastating effect on the defendant and her 
community and that have even greater criminogenic onsequences.120 
116. See supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text. 
117. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755. 
118. See supra notes 100-13 and accompanying text. 
119. See infraPart II. 
120. See infra Section IILA. 
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II. DETERMINING PRETRIAL DETENTION 
Pretrial detention reform movements have both worked within and 
pushed against the constitutional and statutory frameworks described 
above. In doing so, these movements have argued that current pretrial 
procedures reflect two entwined norms: First, that unacceptable bias has 
permeated pretrial detention procedures, just as it has other aspects of the 
criminal process; second, that while some defendants may pose either a 
risk of flight or danger to the community, pretrial detention procedures 
and the impositions on liberty they produce must be limited to those 
necessary to accomplish the state's articulated interests.1 2 1 
Pretrial detention reform is hardly a new phenomenon. For the last 
four decades, waves of pretrial reforms have significantly altered the 
landscape of pretrial detention. From the Vera Institute's efforts in the 
late 1960s to encourage judges to weigh particular factors in making 
pretrial decisions,122 to implementation of risk assessment ools 123 and the 
abandonment of monetary bail,1 2 4 "[t]here are few issues in criminal law 
with greater momentum than bail reform."12 5 Pretrial detention reforms 
have not only created widespread statutory and prosecutorial policy 
changes but have also tapped into, and fueled larger conversations about, 
criminal procedure's function and unequal treatment of marginalized 
communities. 126 
The lack of transparency in the pretrial detention process,12 1 coupled 
with its apparent bias towards poor, minority, and marginalized 
defendants 128 and the long-term consequences of pretrial incarceration on 
121. This Article does not mean to suggest that the forces behind bail and pretrial detention 
reform are monolithic or only bound to the norms described. These norms, however, do appear 
central throughout the movements. 
122. See KATZIVE, supra note 2, at 7-8; THOMAS, supra note 2, at 11; Botein, supra note 2, 
at 326; Ares et al., supra note 2, at 76-86. 
123. See Stevenson, supra note 6, at 344. 
124. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
125. Shima BaradaranBaughman,DividingBailReform, 105 IOWA L. REv. 947, 947 (2020). 
For a succinct history of bail reform, see Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 6, at 507-
18. In addition to its success in bringing about change, few topics have garnered as much scholarly 
attention as quickly. See, e.g., Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, supra note 6, at 2221; Gouldin, supra 
note 64, at 677; Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challengingthe Modern Debtors' 
Prison, 65 UCLA L. REv. 2, 2 (2018); Mayson, DangerousDefendants, supra note 6, at 493; 
Simonson, supra note 3, at 585; Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 711. It is not this Article's goal to 
repeat the work of those scholars who have so ably covered this topic before but rather to use their 
work to highlight both the lack of attention that has been paid to pretrial release conditions and 
the significant hazards such conditions pose. 
126. See Simonson, supranote 3, at 622-30. 
127. Id. at 586-95; Appleman, supra note 15, at 1304-10. 
128. See Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, supra note 6, at 2259; Gouldin, supra note 64, at 678-
80, 724; Colgan, supra note 125, at 74-76. 
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defendants and communities, 129 has driven these reform movements.130 
To date, pretrial detention reform has generated two changes critical to 
this Article: the proliferation of machine-generated pretrial risk 
assessments and, most recently, the abolition of monetary bail. Risk 
assessment ools, which were designed to reduce bias by removing 
aspects of pretrial and sentencing discretion, have nonetheless garnered 
accusations of bias even within reform movements. 131 Elimination of 
monetary bail, which has earned well-deserved praise for reducing bias 
in pretrial detention by removing one of the primary impediments to 
release for marginalized defendants, 132 nonetheless carries problematic 
and underexplored consequences. 133 This Part examines these products 
of pretrial detention reform movements. 
Before continuing in the critique of risk assessment tools and the anti-
bail movement, it is worth noting that this Article is not meant to 
undermine the real and significant work that pretrial detention reform 
movements have accomplished-and, hopefully, will continue to 
accomplish-through these reforms and others. This Article does, 
however, seek to push the conception of pretrial detention reform 
movements toward a more nuanced understanding of the reality of the 
battle occurring daily in courtrooms and in the lives of poor and minority 
defendants and to encourage yet another wave of reform. 
A. Risk Assessment Tools 
Heralded by proponents as a mechanism for reducing arbitrary or 
inaccurate calibration of the risk any particular defendant poses, actuarial 
risk assessment tools have become a major component of the third wave 
of pretrial detention reform. 134 Risk assessment tools purport to predict 
the likelihood of future behavior-in the context of pretrial detention, to 
129. See Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 713-14. 
130. See Jocelyn Simonson, Essay, The Placeof "the People" in CriminalProcedure, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 251-52 (2019). 
131. See, e.g., Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, supra note 6, at 2222-24; Melissa Hamilton, Risk-
Needs Assessment: Constitutionaland Ethical Challenges, 52 AM. CRi. L. REV. 231, 240-42 
(2015); Bernard E. Harcourt, Commentary, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk 
Assessment, 27 FED. SENT'G REP. 237, 237-38 (2015); Aziz Z. Huq, RacialEquity in Algorithmic 
Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1053-54 (2019); John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, 
Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the Future ofBail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1729-
31 (2018); Anne Milgram et al., PretrialRisk Assessment: Improving Public Safety andFairness 
in PretrialDecisionMaking, 27 FED. SENT'GREP. 216, 219-20 (2015); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-
Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 
805-06 (2014). 
132. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 6, at 492-94, 507-09. 
133. See infra Section II.C, Part III. 
134. Gouldin, supra note 64, at 713-16. 
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predict the probability that a defendant either will fail to appear, or will 
commit or be arrested for a new offense. 135 These predictions are helpful 
in that they focus the court's inquiry at the pretrial detention stage and 
offer a "risk assessment" score that the court (or legislators) can use to 
set criteria for release, reducing opportunities for discretionary bias. 136 
Put another way, a defendant who receives a "low" risk score from a risk 
assessment tool is deemed unlikely to reoffend or to abscond while her 
case is pending and, therefore, is a good candidate for release. 137 
Alternatively, a candidate who receives a "high" risk score should be 
released only under limited conditions, or not at all. 138 Others have 
provided a much more in-depth analysis of the mechanics of risk 
assessment tools, but at their core, these tools utilize an algorithm to 
analyze a set of variables based on a dataset to produce the defendant's 
risk score.139 
Despite their promise of precise and unbiased results, risk assessment 
tools are not without their critics. In 2016, ProPublica published an 
expose regarding one such tool, COMPAS, and declared that the software 
was "biased against [B]lacks." 140 Unsurprisingly, the software's creator 
hit back with its own data challenging ProPublica's conclusions. 141 
Regardless of where one falls on the COMPAS bias debate, as 
Professor Sandra Mayson points out, even if the software lacks a bias 
135. Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, supra note 6, at 2228 (describing risk assessment tools as 
"the actuarial assessment of the likelihood of some future event, usually arrest for [a] crime"); 
Eaglin, supra note 6, at 61-62 (describing risk assessment tools in the context of sentencing). 
136. Eaglin, supra note 6, at 62. 
137. See Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 6, at 494-95. 
138. See id. 
139. See How the PSA Works, ADVANCING PRETRIAL POL'Y & RES., 
https://www.psapretrial.org/about/factors [https://perma.cc/J2QF-DYTA] (describing the PSA 
tool and the database it relies upon); What Is the PSA?, ADVANCING PRETRIAL POL'Y & RES., 
https://www.psapretrial.org/about [https://perma.cc/ZSE4-TG6M]. For a description of its 
application in Kentucky, see JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., JFA INST., KENTUCKY PRETRIAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT VALIDATION tbl.11 (2010), https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/ 
System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=60b06cf8-f956-d6fl -d07f-a426f0465 
846&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/WJ95-SSXR]; MARK HEYERLY, KENTUCKY PRETRIAL 
SERVS., PRETRIAL REFORM IN KENTUCKY 10-12 (2013), https://university.pretrial.org/Higher 
Logic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=95c0fae5 -f 2e-72e0-15a2-84e 
d28155d0a&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/SP6N-U3RS]. 
140. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), http://www.pro 
publica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/XTF 
5-MT3E]. 
141. See WILLIAM DIETERICH ET AL., NORTHPOINTE INC. RES. DEP'T, COMPAS RISK SCALES: 
DEMONSTRATING ACCURACY EQUITY AND PREDICTIVE PARITY 1, 2-3, 8-13 (2016), 
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFile 
Key=b3ld4b9f-9ba8-6357-4c08-9839963679df&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/DG2P-YCXN] 
(claiming, contrary to ProPublica's claims, that COMPAS was race-neutral). 
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construct, it relies on biased inputs to produce the risk score. 14 2 Such 
inputs, ranging from socioeconomic-dependent data, such as stability of 
housing or employment, to criminal-focused data, such as prior arrests, 
are both subject to and the products of racial and economic disparity. 14 3 
Beyond this, such data may have limited value in assessing the actual risk 
any given defendant poses pretrial. 144 
Data regarding the number of times a defendant has been arrested may 
signal career criminality, or it may signal residence in a highly policed 
neighborhood, or racial, gender, or socioeconomic profiling by the police. 
Nevertheless, actuarial risk assessment tools rely on arrest data not 
because it is the best data to assess risk, but because it is cheap and readily 
available. 145 In addition, the risk score itself may create a secondary form 
of bias. Judges may treat the same score differently depending as much 
on their own assessment of the defendant as the significance of the 
number generated by the risk assessment tool. 14 6 To paraphrase Annie 
Hall, a defendant with a risk score of three may commit crimes constantly 
or hardly ever. 147 
The critique of bias in actuarial risk assessment tools i hardly new or 
singular. The Department of Justice (DOJ),14 8 scholars, 149 advocacy 
organizations, and the media" have all warned of the possibility of bias 
142. Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, supranote 6, at 2233-34. 
143. See id. at 2229-30, 2233-34. 
144. See id. at 2233-34. 
145. Eaglin, supra note 6, at 101. 
146. Id. at 102-03. 
147. In Woody Allen's film Annie Hall, the title character and her partner, Alvy, are asked 
by their respective therapists if they have sex anymore. ANNIE HALL (Rollins-Joffe Productions 
1977). Alvy responds, "Hardly ever, maybe three times a week." Id. Annie responds, 
"Constantly ... three times a week." Id. 
148. See, e.g., Letter from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Dir., Off. of Pol'y & Legis., to Hon. Patti 
B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sent'g Comm'n 7 (July 29, 2014) (noting that the use of risk assessment at 
sentencing "raises constitutional questions because of the use of group-based characteristics and 
suspect classifications in the analytics"); Eric Holder, U.S. Att'y Gen., Remarks at the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal Justice 
Network Conference (Aug. 1, 2014), www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-
speaks-national-association-criminal-defense-lawyers-57th [https://perma.cc/HEU4-4UTW] 
(warning that risk assessment tools will "exacerbate unwarranted and unjust disparities that are 
already far too common in our criminal justice system and in our society"). 
149. See, e.g., Koepke & Robinson, supra note 131, at 1730; Eaglin, supra note 6, at 62-3; 
Harcourt, supra note 131, at 237 (warning that risk assessment tools' reliance on criminal history 
"will unquestionably aggravate the already intolerable racial imbalance in our prison 
populations"); Hamilton, supranote 131, at 240-42; Milgram et al., supranote 131, at 220; Sonja 
B. Starr, Sentencing, by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 10, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/08/11/opinion/sentencing-by-the-numbers.html [https://perma.cc/7K6P-QQ2W]. 
150. See, e.g., Angwin et al., supranote 140. 
2021 ] BEYOND BAIL 169 
in such tools.151 In the context of sentencing, risk assessments are valued 
for their predictive "accuracy," not their fairness, creating a perverse 
incentive to maintain bias so long as it produces "accurate" results. 152 
Even this claim of accuracy may be problematic as the presence of a 
conviction may create a self-fulfilling prophecy with regard to some 
predicted results. Beyond these critiques, it is questionable that these 
tools do the job they claim. Given the type of data they rely on to generate 
risk scores, their output reflects the historical reality of the criminal 
justice system as much as a prediction of any given defendant's future 
behavior. 153 
Reliance on risk assessment tools to determine eligibility for pretrial 
release is problematic on other levels. First, such tools are often used to 
support the imposition of particular conditions of release. 154 Such a use 
clearly exceeds the intended purpose of these tools to assess risk alone 
(as opposed to making a normative suggestion about conditions that 
might mitigate that risk). Second, such tools may fundamentally 
miscalculate the value of the defendant to her community. 155 In 1994, 
Professor Paul Butler made an analogous argument in the context of jury 
nullification. 156 He noted that a Black community may place greater value 
on the acquittal of defendants accused of drug possession than on their 
conviction, even if there was evidence to support the conviction.157 
Professor Butler argued that the devastating effect of the war on drugs on 
poor Black men and their communities, coupled with the lack of power 
within those communities to challenge police and prosecutorial policies, 
rendered nullification a powerful tool to alter the bias effect of such 
policies and, in the process, to promote and empower community 
values. 158 Community bail funds have made a similar argument regarding 
pretrial detention-noting that communities, not just defendants, benefit 
when a person makes bail. 159 
In the context of actuarial risk assessment tools, a similar argument 
might be made. An assessment tool might consider a defendant who is 
likely either to fail to appear or to be arrested for a new offense a poor 
candidate for pretrial release. Members of her community, however, 
151. Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, supranote 6, at 2228-30. 
152. See Eaglin, supra note 6, at 97-98. 
153. See Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, supra note 6, at 2229-30. 
154. See Eaglin, supra note 6, at 62. 
155. See Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, supra note 6, at 2234. 
156. See Paul Butler, Essay, Racially Based Jury Nullification:Black Power in the Criminal 
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995). 
157. Id. at 678. 
158. Id. at 679. 
159. See NAT'L BAILOUT, https://nationalbailout.org/ [https://perma.cc/58US-RSG5]; 
NationalBail FundNetwork, CMTY. JUST. EXCH., https://www.comnunlityjusticeexchange.org/ 
national-bail-fund-network [https://perma.cc/K6PN-BW93]. 
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might recognize the economic and practical challenges of court 
appearances or the high probability of arrest-regardless of activity-and 
might prioritize her continued presence in the community over any risk 
of flight or perceived dangerousness. Or, a community may simply value 
having its members remain within the community more than it fears any 
risk they may present. In this, the risk assessment tool might 
mischaracterize the community's concerns and desires, undermining 
faith in its fairness or even accuracy. 
Whether discussing potential bias in the tool (either as a matter of 
input or output) or the failure of the tool to accurately account for 
community values, one underlying concern is ever-present-the lack of 
information available about how the tool functions.160 Lack of 
transparency about both the dataset itself and the algorithm used to 
analyze the information requires a sort of blind faith, not only on the part 
of judges who rely on the scores but also on the part of the defendants 
and members of the community who suffer the consequences of such 
scores. Lack of transparency may also create obstacles to challenging 
actuarial risk assessment tools. Unlike allegations of discrimination by 
police, prosecutors, or judges-challenging claims to make in and of 
themselves-the algorithms risk assessment tools rely on to generate risk 
scores are the well-guarded secrets of the corporations who developed 
and marketed them.161 Even if the code for the algorithm is publicly 
available, there is insufficient and competing data on their effect on poor 
and minority defendants. 162 This lack of information may make a 
defendant's burden to demonstrate either bias or inaccuracy difficult to 
accomplish. 163 In short, defendants may suffer bias as a result of the 
actuarial risk assessment ool16 4 but lack sufficient information to prove 
such bias to a court or other government agency. Far from infusing the 
pretrial detention process with certainty and consistency, risk assessment 
tools may therefore promote obscurity and distrust. 
Despite this myriad of concerns, jurisdictions across the country 
continue to adopt risk assessment tools. Kentucky was one of the early 
160. See Susan Turner & Julie Gerlinger, Risk Assessment and Realignment, 53 SANTA 
CLARAL. REV. 1039, 1045 (2013). 
161. See id. 
162. See Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 772. 
163. The lack-of-transparency hurdle is not confined to risk assessment tools. An analogous 
challenge exists for defendants seeking to challenge charging decisions. Because charging 
decisions are made entirely within a prosecutor's office, a defendant lacks information regarding 
charging and dismissal patterns. However, a defendant is not entitled to discovery to mount such 
a challenge unless he can first demonstrate a discriminatory pattern, which he cannot do unless 
he has access to discovery. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996). 
164. See Michael Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues in the PredictionofRecidivism, 26 FED. 
SENT'GREP. 167, 173 (2014). 
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adopters of an actuarial risk assessment tool 65 and, as the tools have 
become more widely accepted and more economical, more jurisdictions 
have followed suit.166 Kentucky adopted a tool known as the Public 
Safety Assessment (PSA). 167 Developed by the Laura and John Arnold 
Foundation, the PSA relies on a representative dataset to predict the 
defendant's future dangerousness and flight probability while on pretrial 
release. 168 Like other tools, the PSA analyzes a set of variables to 
determine a defendant's risk score. 169 Unlike other tools, however, it does 
not require a defendant interview, though it appears in Kentucky 
interviews do take place. 170 The PSA's lack of an interview requirement 
is not only a significant deviation from other actuarial risk assessment 
tools, but it is also a significant change from former pretrial services 
assessments that relied on defendant interviews, among other things, to 
assess risk. 171 According to the PSA's developers, by considering a 
165. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066(2) (West 2020). 
166. See Press Release, White House Off. of the Press Sec'y, FACT SHEET: Launching the 
Data-Driven Justice Initiative: Disrupting the Cycle of Incarceration (June 30, 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/30/fact-sheet-launching-data-
driven-justice-initiative-disrupting-cycle [https://perma.cc/7N5A-UR8P] (announcing the Obama 
administration's Data-Driven Justice Initiative to promote, among other reforms, the use of risk 
assessment tools as means to identify low-risk defendants who could be released while their trials 
were pending); Shalia Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formulafor Bail, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of-bail-into-a-
science.html [https://perma.cc/9MHS-NUZ5]. The Laura and John Arnold Foundation reports 
that forty states have adopted its Public Safety Assessment Tool. PretrialRisk Assessment Now 
Available to All Interested Jurisdictions; Research Advisory Board Announced, ARNOLD 
VENTURES (July 11, 2018), https://www.arnoldventures.org/newsroom/laura-and-john-arnold-
foundation-makes-pretrial-risk-assessment-available-to-all-jurisdictions-announces-expert-panel 
-to-serve-as-pretrial-research-advisory-board/ [https://perma.cc/4UE5-MS5N]. 
167. See VirtualTour ofKentucky PretrialServices, KY. CT. OF JUST., https://courts.ky.gov/ 
courtprograms/pretrialservices/Pages/virtualtour.aspx [https://perma.cc/QCJ7-YNGC]; Jason 
Tashea, Kentucky Tests New Assessment Tool to Determine Whether to Keep Defendants Behind 
Bars, ABA J. (Apr. 1, 2015, 3:50 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/nagazine/article/kentucky_ 
tests_new_assessmenttoolto_determine_whether_to-keepdefendants [http ://perma.cc/YLZ6 
-KREJ]. 
168. See How the PSA Works, supra note 139 (describing the PSA tool and the database it 
relies upon). For a description of its application in Kentucky, see AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 139, 
at tbl.11; MARK HEYERLY, supranote 139 at 3, 5. 
169. See What is the PSA?, supra note 139. 
170. See Stevenson, supranote 6, at 345-46 (describing the function of the PSA). The PSA 
weighs its assessment based on criminal history and prior failures to appear. See AUSTIN ET AL., 
supra note 139, at tbl.l . In addition, it considers other factors such as the defendant's 
employment, housing, and the presence of a reference willing to attend court or cosign an imposed 
bond. Id. at tbl.6. 
171. For example, the Indiana Risk Assessment System's Community Supervision Intake 
Assessment relies on a structured interview. UNIV. OF CINCINNATI, INDIANA RISK ASSESSMENT 
SYSTEM 2-2 to 2-8 (2010), https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/Download 
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closed universe of data, the tool can predict the defendant's risk, 
recommend appropriate conditions of release, and avoid potential bias. 172 
Kentucky, in its adoption of the PSA, did not completely eliminate 
pretrial hearings and the judicial discretion that accompany them. 173 
However, this remnant of discretion is not without its hazards. 
Implementation ofthe pretrial assessment program in Kentucky produced 
uneven results depending on the judge conducting the hearing. 174 In this 
sense, even if the assessment tool itself was not biased-a contested 
proposition to be sure-the judge's interpretation of the risk score 
produced by the tool was inevitably subject to the judge's bias. 175 
Concerns over bias embedded in discretionary decisions are hardly new. 
Before pretrial detention reform movements, sentencing reformers 
argued that judicial discretion was a minefield of bias and inequity. 17 6 
Yet, in discretion also lies semblances of humanity and the 
opportunity for community values to emerge. The same judge that might 
prevent the pretrial release of a defendant based on prejudice might also 
be the judge who recognizes that a rote calculation generated by an 
algorithm and based on preordained factors might overlook the reality of 
a defendant and the need for release. In the end, despite Kentucky's 
adoption of assessment tools, judges within the state continue to exercise 
broad discretion during pretrial detention hearings. 177 
B. NonmonetaryBail 
In addition to the use of actuarial risk assessment ools, some 
jurisdictions-most notably California, New York, New Jersey, and 
Philadelphia-have adopted policies that permit release of particular 
defendants without a hearing and without a requirement of monetary 
DocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=2773499f-10a4-210d-5017-7c3d57ece0ld&forceDialog=0 
[https://perma.cc/H3B9-A3R5]. The COMPAS system relies on the collection of offender data 
and the defendant's self-reporting. NORTHPOINTE INST. FOR PUB. MGMT., INC., COMPAS RISK & 
NEED ASSESSMENT SYSTEM 1 (2010), http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/technical_documents/ 
Selected_CompasQuestionsPosed byInquiringAgencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/22HT-M3T8]. 
172. See How the PSA Works, supra note 139; What is the PSA?, supranote 139. 
173. See Stevenson, supra note 6, at 309-10, 344-46. 
174. Id. at 309-10, 346-48 (noting that judges in rural and predominately white counties 
treated risk scores differently than judges in urban, predominately Black counties). 
175. See id. 
176. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, INTRA-CITY DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SENTENCING 
PRACTICES: FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES IN 30 CITIES, 2005-2017, at 6 (2019), https://www.ussc 
.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2019/20190108_Intra-
City-Report.pdf#page=9 [https://perma.cc/FW5C-8WHF] (noting that discretion in sentencing 
has long served to produce unequal results). 
177. See Stevenson, supra note 6, at 344-48. 
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bail. 178 Eligibility for such release is a product of the defendant's charge 
and her assessed risk. 179 Defendants charged with relatively low-level 
offenses, such as minor property, drug possession, or nonviolent felony 
offenses, and who have little to no prior criminal history, may be released 
without monetary bail and no or few other conditions of release.18 0 
Admittedly, such reforms are imperfect. They may still rely on 
actuarial risk assessment tools that carry their own bias, and many are 
limited in scope and dependent entirely on prosecutorial discretion 
regarding the charge.181 A defendant in possession of narcotics, for 
example, may enjoy pretrial release without bail in Philadelphia if she is 
charged with possession of narcotics, but she may not enjoy release if she 
is charged with possession with intent to deliver.1 1 2 Likewise, a defendant 
accused of beating up his girlfriend may enjoy pretrial release without 
bail if he is charged with a low-level assault without a domestic violence 
enhancement, but he may not enjoy release if he is charged either with a 
higher level of assault or if the assault is charged as domestic violence. 183 
Charging decisions are entirely at the discretion of the prosecutor, 
allowing both bias and potential manipulation to come into play even as 
the district attorney claims to be abandoning bail policies that 
discriminate against poor and predominately minority defendants. 184 
178. See Vanessa Romo, CaliforniaBecomes the FirstState to End Cash BailAfter 40-Year 
Fight,NPR (Aug. 28, 2018, 10:49 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/28/642795284/california-
becomes-first-state-to-end-cash-bail [https://perma.cc/LMY5-PUAX]; Jesse McKinley & Ashley 
Southall, KaliefBrowder's Suicide Inspired a Push to End Cash Bail. Now Lawmakers Have a 
Deal., N.Y. TimEs (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/29/nyregion/kalief-
browder-cash-bail-reform.html [https://perma.cc/Q2RT-VQAU]; Lisa W. Foderaro, New Jersey 
Alters Its Bail System and Upends Legal Landscape, N.Y. TIEs (Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/nyregion/new-jersey-bail-system.html [https://perma.cc/ 
VYJ3-R2B4]; Melamed, supra note 5; Katie Honan & Ben Chapman, New York City's Latest Bail 
Reform Aims to Keep More Teens Out of Jail, WALL ST. J. (May 28, 2019, 8:05 PM), 
https://www.wsj .com/articles/new-york-citys-latest-bail-reform-aims-to-keep-more-teens-out-of 
-jail-11559083485 [https://perma.cc/2SGC-73ZN]. 
179. See Aurdlie Ouss & Megan Stevenson, Bail, Jail, and Pretrial Misconduct: The 
Influence of Prosecutors 14 (June 20, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3335138 [https://perma.cc/EJ9K-7YX6]. In Philadelphia, for 
instance, the district attorney "[Larry] Krasner announced that his office would stop seeking 
monetary bail if the lead charge was among a set of 25 low-level offenses." Id. In New York, the 
no bail reform would eliminate bail forboth misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies. See McKinley 
& Southall, supra note 178. 
180. See Ouss & Stevenson, supra note 179, at 14. 
181. See id. (noting the practice in Philadelphia where defendants only enjoy no bail when 
charged with specified offenses). 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 14, 17 n.27. 
184. Recent critiques of Philadelphia's bail policies suggest that such manipulation is in fact 
occurring. See Covert, supra note 5. 
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Despite these imperfections, nonmonetary bail reforms are significant 
for several reasons. First, they signal the state's willingness to permit 
release during the pendency of trial. Whether out of a recognition of the 
deleterious collateral effects of pretrial detention or out of some less 
progressive ulterior motive or motives, the result has been the same-a 
defendant who might previously have remained in jail while her case 
wound its way through court can now be released. 185 
As a former public defender, the Author knows firsthand what 
scholars and community bail reformers assert-a defendant who is not in 
custody can better maintain her personal dignity and identity by 
remaining in her community.18 ' Moreover, she can fight the charges 
against her betterbecause she is in a better position to assist in her defense 
outside of jail than inside. 18 7 Outside she can help track down witnesses 
or prepare to testify.188 Outside she can maintain her ties to her family, 
community, job, or school.189 Outside she can utilize available 
community resources, including mental health treatment and substance 
abuse treatment.190 Outside she is less likely to take a plea deal out of 
desperation. 191 Outside she is in a betterposition to see her case dismissed 
or funneled to an alternative resolution, such as a pretrial diversion or 
deferral of prosecution. 192 Outside she is more likely to receive a 
favorable plea deal or sentence. 193 
As countless studies over the last forty-plus years have demonstrated, 
even a seemingly small fine, fee, or bail amount may impose an 
insurmountable financial burden on a defendant and her family. 194 Put 
plainly, a defendant may linger in jail pretrial even with a small bail 
185. See Emily Bazelon & Miriam Krinsky, There's a Wave ofNew Prosecutors.And They 
Mean Justice., N.Y. TimEs (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/opinion/how-
local-prosecutors-can-reform-their-justice-systems.html# [https://perma.cc/4QXR-3FAV]. 
186. See Crystal S. Yang, Towardan Optimal BailSystem, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1416-
38 (2017); Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 713-14; Simonson, supranote 3, at 595. 
187. See Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 722. 
188. See id. at 714. 
189. See Yang, supra note 186, at 1417-21, 1423, 1427. 
190. See Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 727. 
191. See Yang, supra note 186, at 1419. 
192. See Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 722. The prosecution may also have some incentive 
to offer a person on pretrial release a speedy resolution of the case. Not only does it promote 
efficiency, but it also demonstrates a type of benevolent prosecutorial discretion-if a defendant 
works hard and maintains a law-abiding existence, she will receive a benefit from the state that 
might otherwise seek her conviction. 
193. See Yang, supra note 186, at 1419-21. 
194. See CHRIS W. SURPRENANT, GEO. MASON UNIV., COVID-19 AND PRETRIAL DETENTION 
3 (2020). 
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9 5 amount. 1 In such cases, the incentive to resolve the case may be 
especially high and the bargaining position of the defendant especially 
low.196 Seen in this light, these reforms are important because they take 
an admittedly small step toward leveling the criminal court playing field 
for marginalized defendants by granting poor defendants the same 
advantage of pretrial release enjoyed by wealthier defendants. 197 
Second, early studies suggest that such reforms have not resulted in 
an increase in either failures to appear or recidivism among defendants 
who have benefitted from them. 198 A recent study of defendants in 
Philadelphia who were released pretrial under the district attorney's 
policy found no significant difference in either failures to appear or new 
offenses compared to the prior system, which followed a monetary bail 
schedule for such defendants. 199 Admittedly, the data are limited given 
the novelty of the policy. These results, however, are consistent with 
longitudinal studies conducted by the Vera Institute and the Laura and 
John Arnold Foundation, which concluded that relatively low-risk 
defendants-those with little to no criminal history, charged with minor 
offenses, and with community ties-are highly likely to reappear in court 
and to avoid new charges even with few or no conditions of release.200 
Admittedly, the reform efforts in Philadelphia have come under 
criticism, as community stakeholders assert that prosecutors are both 
erratic and nontransparent in their bail requests-requesting bail in cases 
that appear to fall within the no bail policy inconsistently and without 
explanation or warning. 201 This may signal either additional bias within 
the prosecutor's office-even as it seeks to implement a progressive 
policy-or a lack of genuineness regarding the reform. Either is difficult 
to diagnose from afar. The fact that the policies are internal to the 
prosecutor's office (as opposed to the product of a court mandate or 
legislative reform) render them difficult to enforce. As frustrating as the 
failure to conform to the policy may be, the continued public critique of 
195. Kalief Browder, whose suicide ignited New York's bail reform movement, was held in 
pretrial detention for two years when his bail was set at $3,000, an amount his family could not 
post on his behalf. McKinley & Southall, supranote 178. 
196. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 517, 532-33 (1972); Heaton et al., supranote 4, at 
741-59. 
197. Even in this progress, clearly the power dynamic is still skewed. Policing and 
prosecutorial discretion still cut against marginal and minority defendants. Police still overpatrol 
poor neighborhoods, and prosecutors continue to charge low-level offenses against minority 
defendants as a result of these patrols. See Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, supranote 6, at 2251-57 
(noting this phenomenon in the context of risk assessment tools that rely on arrests as indicia of 
risk). 
198. Ouss & Stevenson, supranote 179, at 22-23. 
199. Id. 
200. See KATZIVE, supra note 2, at 14-15; THOMAS, supranote 2, at 25; Botein, supra note 
2, at 327; Ares et al., supranote 2, at 86; What Is the PSA?, supra note 139. 
201. See Covert, supranote 5. 
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the office's policies demonstrates a continued commitment towards both 
eradicating bail within the community the office purports to serve and 
holding the elected prosecutor accountable. These commitments can and 
should be seen as a real sign of progress, even as the policy itself may be 
imperfect in its implementation. 
C. 2020 andPretrialRelease 
Events of 2020 have highlighted shortcomings in the pretrial detention 
system-both in the context of monetary bail and in the context of 
nonmonetary conditions of release. The global pandemic of COVID-19 
has not only created new risks for pretrial detainees, but it has also called 
into question calculations of safety and unrealistic compliance 
requirements for release. In addition, George Floyd's killing and the 
protests that followed have not only sparked new calls for reform, 
disaggregation, and abolition within the criminal system in general and 
the pretrial detention system in particular, but these events have also laid 
bare judicial reliance on pretrial release conditions as a means to silence 
dissent and promote a singular conception of safety. These combined 
occurrences-COVID-19, Floyd's death, and the social unrest that 
followed-are not the products of the pretrial detention system (though 
police killed Floyd as they took him into custody). Nor do they solely 
affect this system. But they do bring to the surface in an exaggerated 
sense the flaws that have always existed in the system. This Section 
explores what these crises have exposed. 
1. COVID-19 
In many ways, COVID-19 has exposed the flaws in existing pretrial 
detention systems. 202 As jail administrators witnessed the shutdown of 
courts in the face of the pandemic, pretrial detention populations, already 
disproportionately large, burgeoned.2 0 3 With speedy trial checks no 
longer in place, pretrial detainees lingered in jails, increasing not only the 
population but the contagion risk.2 04 Even before COVID-19 outbreaks 
in jails and prisons across the nation, advocates urged a reconsideration 
of pretrial detention policies. 205 They noted not only that social distancing 
was impossible in jail but also that many pretrial detainees were 
202. See Jenny E. Carroll, PretrialDetention in the Time ofCOVID-19, 115 Nw. U. L. REV. 
ONLINE 59, 72 (2020). 
203. See SURPRENANT, supra note 194, at 1-2. 
204. See Carroll, supra note 202, at 73-75. 
205. See, e.g., Frank Green, ACLU, Others Call for Urgent Prison and Jail Releases in 
Response to COVID-19, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Apr. 9, 2020), https://richmond.com/news/ 
virginia/aclu-others-call-for-urgent-prison-and-jail-releases-in-response-to-covid-19/articlea76 
7265a-a6e0-5ab8-8897-9af68bc4le15.html [https://perma.cc/A8RB-WRTB]. 
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especially vulnerable to the coronavirus and were held on accusations of 
nonviolent or minor offenses more because of their poverty than their 
dangerousness or risk of flight. 206 
Admittedly, different actors reacted differently to these calls for 
release. Consider the Mobile Jail in Alabama. Early in the pandemic, the 
jail decided to release a third of its inmate population-including many 
pretrial detainees.207 Other responses were less vigorous. Mayor Bill 
DeBlasio's office, which promised release of nonviolent, older, and 
medically vulnerable inmates as well as those held on small bail holds, 
was criticized for releasing few inmates even as COVID-19 rates rose at 
Riker's Island. 208 And Attorney General William Barr was widely 
criticized for the DOJ's failure to make good on COVID-19 releases 
within the federal system.209 Regardless of these reactions, the reality that 
COVID-19 exposed was threefold. The first was well-documented 
previously: as judges calculate pretrial detention risks and mitigation, 
they either tend toward detention or conditions of release (monetary or 
otherwise) that are out of reach of those to whom the conditions are 
applied.210 In short, current pretrial detention models produce huge jail 
populations. Second, many pretrial release efforts failed in the midst of 
COVID-19 because inmates and their communities could not comply 
with the required conditions of release. While monetary bail requirements 
were often waived, conditions of release, such as EHM or housing 
206. See, e.g., Miranda Bryant, CoronavirusSpreadatRikersIs a 'PublicHealth Disaster', 
Says Jail's Top Doctor, GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2020/apr/01/rikers-island-jail-coronavirus-public-health-disaster [https://perma.cc/23AZ-
QTVH]; SURPRENANT, supranote 194, at 3. 
207. See Christopher Harress, Amid COVID-19 Pandemic, Mobile Metro JailReleases a 
Third of Inmates, AL.COM (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.al.com/news/2020/04/amid-covid-19-
pandemic-mobile-metro-jail-releases-a-third-of-inmates.html [https://perma.cc/L6GB-JCD8]. 
Even with this release, the jail experienced an outbreak, with approximately seventy inmates and 
forty-five employees testing positive a month later. John Sharp, Mobile Metro Jail Is Now 
COVID-19 Free, Sheriff Says, AL.CoM (June 24, 2020), https://www.al.com/crime/2020/06/ 
mobile-metro-jail-is-now-covid-19-free-sheriff-says.html [https://perma.cc/8U5J-9R72]. 
208. See Katie Shepherd, 'Trapped on Rikers': Jails and Prisons Face Coronavirus 
Catastropheas Officials Slowly Authorize Releases, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2020, 6:14 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/03/23/coronavirus-rikers-island-releases/ [https:// 
perma.cc/M2MD-49BS]. 
209. See Katie Benner, Barr Expands Early Release of Inmates at Prisons Seeing More 
Coronavirus Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/03/us/ 
politics/barr-coronavirus-prisons-release.html [https://perma.cc/ECC9-XBWL]; Ian MacDougall, 
Bill BarrPromisedto Release PrisonersThreatened by Coronavirus Even as the Feds Secretly 
Made It Harder for Them to Get Out, PROPUBLICA (May 26, 2020, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/bill-barr-promised-to-release-prisoners-threatened-by-coronavims-
even-as-the-feds-secretly-made-it-harder-for-them-to-get-out [https://perma.cc/9H9G-F9ZX]. 
210. See Sandra G. Mayson, Detention by Any Other Name, 69 DUKE L.J. 1643, 1652-53 
(2020). 
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requirements, were not.211 Without resources for these conditions of 
release, inmates lingered in jail in the midst of the crisis. Finally, pretrial 
detention models are inflexible or too singular in their construction of 
safety. 2 12 During a global pandemic such as COVID-19, the safety 
calculations that ordinarily occur in a pretrial setting failed to consider 
that a community and a defendant might be safer if allowed to shelter at 
home as opposed to remaining detained. As discussed above, calculations 
of safety rely on rigid assumptions not only about what safety means but 
also about who should have the opportunity to define safety.213 
2. George Floyd's Death and the Protests that Followed 
Like COVID-19, George Floyd's death and the protests that followed 
revealed preexisting global flaws in the criminal system that are 
informative to thinking about pretrial detention. On a basic level, the 
crisis following Floyd's death, like COVID-19, highlighted a need to 
reconsider concepts of safety within the criminal system. Protestors took 
to the streets across the nation and the globe to question both the value of 
the criminal system defining safety and the wisdom of relying on the 
criminal system's actors to enforce those notions of safety. 214 Calls for 
reforming the criminal system, 215 decriminalizing low-level offenses, and 
defunding, disaggregating, or even abolishing the police 216 are, in many 
ways, challenges to criminal laws' efforts to monopolize both definitions 
211. See ProsecutorsResponses to Covid-19, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 15, 2020), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/prosecutors-responses-covid-19 
[https://perma.cc/MT8U-74TM]. 
212. See Carroll, supra note 202, at 81-83. 
213. See id. at 82-85; Jenny E. Carroll, Safety, Crisis, and CriminalLaw, ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2021). 
214. See, e.g., Derrick Bryson Taylor, GeorgeFloydProtests:A Timeline, N.Y. TIMES (July 
10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-protests-timeline.html [https://perma 
.cc/L847-LT3S]; ProtestsAcross the Globe After George Floyd'sDeath, CNN (June 13, 2020, 
3:22 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/world/gallery/intl-george-floyd-protests/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/RY3D-YURC]. 
215. See, e.g., Garrett Felber, Police Reform Hasn'tStopped the Killings Before. It Won't 
Now Either., TRUTHOUT (July 5, 2020), https://truthout.org/articles/police-reform-hasnt-stopped-
the-killings-before-it-wont-now-either/ [https://perma.cc/G6QZ-HYZK]; Karl A. Racine, The 
District's New Racial Justice Future, WASH. POST (June 1, 2020, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/01/districts-new-racial-justice-future/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q96F-5RBK]. 
216. See, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, How Defund andDisbandBecame the Demands, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS (June 15, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2020/06/15/how-defund-and-
disband-became-the-demands/ [https://perma.cc/UX4G-ET4L]; Jocelyn Simonson, Power over 
Policing,Bos. REV. (June 8, 2020), http://bostonreview.net/law-justice/jocelyn-simonson-power-
over-policing [https://perma.cc/SQ7E-HEUK]; Mariame Kaba, Yes, We Mean LiterallyAbolish 
the Police, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/ 
floyd-abolish-defund-police.html [https://perma.cc/W35M-JDDZ]. 
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of safety and the conditions that promote safety in the face of a criminal 
accusation. 
For its part, the criminal system's response to these challenges has 
been a rejection of any effort to realign definitions of safety and resistance 
to protestors' acts of dissent. Local police have tear gassed, pepper 
sprayed and bulleted, beaten, and arrested protestors.217 They have done 
so in riot gear in plain view 2 18 and through stealth detainment by 
plainclothes officers in unmarked vans. 219 Federal agents have joined in 
quelling the protests.220 U.S. Attorneys have indicted 221 and courts have 
217. See, e.g., Alta Spells, PortlandPoliceHave Made atLeast 500 ArrestsDuringNightly 
ProtestsSince May 29, CNN (Aug. 21, 2020, 4:12 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/21/us/ 
portland-police-arrests/index.html [https://perma.cc/9LVF-HZSP]; Anita Snow, AP Tally: 
Arrests at Widespread US Protests Hit 10,000, AP NEWS (June 4, 2020), https://apnews.com/ 
bb2404f9bl3c8b53b94c73f818f6a0b7 [https://perma.cc/FQ4Q-8NBS]; Video Appears to Show 
Police Pepper Spraying Yelling Protestor, CNN (June 2, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/videos/ 
us/2020/06/02/protester-yell-police-pepper-spray-tapper-lead-vpx.cnn [https://perma.cc/AG33-
QWNW]; Shaila Dewan & Mike Baker, FacingProtests Over Use ofForce, PoliceRespond with 
More Force, N.Y. TIMEs (June 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/police-tactics-
floyd-protests.html [https://perma.cc/5AJD-X8LM]. 
218. See, e.g., Sarah-Grace Mankarious & AJ Willingham, How American Police Gear Up 
to Respond to Protests,CNN (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/07/us/police-
gear-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/4J8A-VX83]; Michael E. Miller, 'Begging' to be Heard: 
Young ProtestorsImplore Police to Acknowledge Them andTheir Cause, WASH. POST (June 4, 
2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/were-begging-for-us-to-be-heard-
young-protesters-implore-police-to-acknowledge-them-and-their-cause/2020/06/04/19557452-a 
507-1lea-b473-04905blaf82bstory.html [https://perma.cc/Z2XS-R8FA]. 
219. See, e.g., Mihir Zaveri & Michael Gold, Video of N.YP.D. Pulling ProtestorInto 
Unmarked Van Draws Criticism, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/07/28/nyregion/nypd-protester-van.html [https://perma.cc/8VT6-LPB5]; Katie Shepherd & 
Mark Berman, 'It Was Like Being Preyed Upon': PortlandProtestersSay FederalOfficers in 
Unmarked Vans Are Detaining Them, WASH. POST (July 17, 2020, 8:24 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/07/17/portland-protests-federal-arrests/ [https:// 
perma.cc/3PX2-8DHU]. 
220. See, e.g., Katie Rogers, Protestors Dispersed with Tear Gas so Trump CouldPose at 
Church, N.Y. TIMEs (July 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/us/politics/trump-st-
johns-church-bible.html [https://perma.cc/PS2C-HTNY]. 
221. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Atty's Off. Dist. of Or., 22 Arrested, Facing Federal 
Charges After Weekend Protest at Federal Courthouse in Portland (July 27, 2020), 
https ://www. justice.gov/usao -or/pr/22-arrested-facing-federal-charges-after-weekend-protest-
federal-courthouse-portland [https://perma.cc/S55M-XLUY]; Eric Halliday, The Federal 
Government's Aggressive Prosecution of Protestors, LAWFARE (July 13, 2020, 12:22 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/federal-governments-aggressive-prosecution-protestors [https:// 
perma.cc/Z9HB-JW6Q]; Cyrus Farivar & Olivia Solon, FBI Trawled Facebook to Arrest 
Protestorsfor Inciting Riots, Court Records Show, NBC NEWS (June 19, 2020, 4:26 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews. com/tech/social-media/federal-agents-monitored-facebook-arrest-protesters-
inciting-riots-court-records-n1231531 [https://perma.cc/QPE6-UTEM]. But see, e.g., Keith L. 
Alexander et al., ProsecutorsDropMany Rioting Charges as Dozens Chargedin D. C. Protests 
Appear in Court, WASH. POST (June 1, 2020, 8:30 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
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imposed bail and pretrial conditions of release-including, in at least one 
jurisdiction, the imposition of a pretrial condition of release that 
prohibited further participation in protest movements.22 2 While this may 
appear at first blush to be a novel pretrial condition of release, in reality, 
it is consistent with the imposition of pretrial conditions that restrict the 
accused's liberty and thus triggers substantive due process concerns. 
D. The Takeawayfrom Years ofReform anda Year of Unrest 
Just as it is hard to understate the impact of the twin crises of 2020 
COVID-19 and social unrest following George Floyd's death-on 
conceptions of the criminal system and the calculus of pretrial detention, 
it is hard to understate the positive impact of years of bail reform for poor 
and marginalized defendants. Despite reform efforts, the events of 2020 
make clear that criminal law, in its construction of safety, often 
miscalculates community needs-particularly the needs of marginalized 
communities. While this argument can certainly be made broadly, it is 
also clear that continued emphasis on the twin concerns of future 
dangerousness and flight risk in the pretrial detention context-despite 
reform efforts-has created a system more likely to detain the poorest 
and most marginalized. In addition, conditions of release imposed during 
the COVID-19 crisis emphasize how difficult it is for marginalized 
individuals to comply. The absence of support systems or even EHM 
capability in communities resulted in continued detention for many in the 
midst of the pandemic despite release orders. These defendants could not 
get out of jail because there was no way for them to comply with the 
court's release order. This disconnect between the court's calculus of 
what is necessary to mitigate pretrial release and what is actually 
available in the community for defendants exacerbates the nation's 
current swollen pretrial detention population. 
It is also worth noting that bail reforms, whether in states like New 
Jersey, California, New York, or Kentucky, or in jurisdictions like 
Philadelphia or New York City, are imperfect even as they are beneficial. 
First, pretrial detention hearings remain truncated affairs. 223 In Kentucky, 




222. See Rebecca Boone & Jake Bleiberg, Federal Court to Review 'ProtestBans' in 
PortlandArrests, WASH. POST (July 29, 2020, 5:19 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
national/federal-court-to-review-protest-bans-in-portland-arrests/2020/07/29/2e21 l7ae-dle 1-11 
ea-826b-cc394d824e35_story.html [https://perma.cc/XH56-E78Y]. 
223. See BAZELON, supranote 18, at 37; Heaton et al., supranote 4, at 720. 
2
2021 ] BEYOND BAIL 181 
assessment tool has rendered the hearing more nuanced or lengthier. 24 
Judges still rely on the assessment tool to set the baseline, and studies 
suggest that bail hearings remain one- to five-minute events.225 This is 
significant not only because it suggests that major decisions are being 
made quickly and based on relatively little information but also because, 
once a bail decision is made, a party may not request reconsideration of 
that decision absent evidence of some new circumstance. 226 This 
restriction has the effect of rendering a pretrial detention decision, once 
made, nearly irreversible from the defendant's perspective.227 
Beyond this, pretrial detention hearings often fail to engage in a 
meaningful analysis of appropriate conditions of release.2 2 8 Instead, these 
hearings tend to be quick, relatively superficial, and formulaic, with 
courts routinely imposing conditions on defendants regardless of the 
perceived risks-and often based on the perception of the risk alone with 
little or no effort to establish the nexus between the risk and the proposed 
cure. 2 29 Such conditions include avoiding new arrests, refraining from the 
use of illegal drugs (and in some jurisdictions alcohol), reporting to a 
pretrial services officer, and complying with a no-contact order if the 
allegation involved either a particular location (for property crimes) or a 
224. See Stevenson, supra note 6, at 310, 345-46. 
225. See id. Data from other jurisdictions are similar. A study in Prince George's County, 
Maryland, found that pretrial detention decisions were made in a matter of minutes. See COLOR 
OF CHANGE & PROGRESSIVE MD., PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY: A STUDY OF BAIL 4, 9, 13 (2018), 
https://static.colorofchange.org/static/v3/pgreport.pdf?akid=14740.3112990.hZo0eM& 
rd=1&t=8 [https://perma.cc/PX43-KP9F] (describing bail hearings in Prince George's County as 
quick affairs with "most lasting no more than five minutes, and some concluding within one 
minute"); Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The EmpiricalandLegal Case 
for the Right to CounselatBail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1755 (2002) (observing that pretrial 
detention hearings in Baltimore City with counsel lasted "on average, two minutes and thirty-
seven seconds, versus one minute, forty-seven seconds without counsel"). 
226. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (providing that ajudge may reopen a pretrial detention question 
only when there is new evidence that is material to the decision of whether detention is 
appropriate). Courts have found that the statute limits a judge's discretion to reopen bail issues. 
See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Adorno, 606 F. Supp. 2d 232, 237 (D.P.R. 2009) (stating 
that the judge's discretion to reopen a detention hearing is limited by § 3142(f)(2)(B)); United 
States v. Cannon, 711 F. Supp. 2d 602, 605-06 (E.D. Va. 2010) (stating that the judge's discretion 
to reopen a detention hearing is limited by § 3142 but noting the statute did not apply in the case). 
227. See § 3142(f); see also Rodriguez-Adorno, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 237 (stating that the 
judge's discretion to reopen a detention hearing is limited by § 3142(f)(2)(B)). In contrast, from 
the prosecutor's perspective, decisions of release are reversed when defendants violate conditions 
of release. 
228. See Gold, supranote 10, at 515, 519; Samuel R. Wiseman, FixingBail, 84 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 417, 446-47 (2016); see also Colbert et al., supranote 225, at 1755-56 (finding that the 
presence of an attorney "improved the substantive justice" for defendants at bail hearings). 
229. See COLOR OF CHANGE & PROGRESSIVE MD., supra note 225, at 13. 
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particular victim (for crimes against a person). 230 In cases involving 
narcotics, random urinalysis is also routinely ordered regardless of 
whether the defendant has demonstrated any risk for drug use or whether 
that risk of drug use is related to the articulated interests of bail statutes 
preventing flight and ensuring safety.2 3 1 All such conditions carry 
consequences-monetary and otherwise-for the defendants and their 
communities. 232 
Even in jurisdictions that have adopted no bail positions, prosecutors 
ask for, and defendants often agree to, set conditions of release. 233 In 
other words, it is disingenuous to label the pretrial release that occurs in 
jurisdictions like Philadelphia or New York City for designated offenses 
"unregulated" release. In fact, this form of release may still require 
defendants, for example, to report to pretrial services, maintain no-
contact orders, submit to drug testing, or maintain work or educational 
commitments. 2 34 When asked what happens if a defendant does not agree 
to these conditions, a defense attorney responded, "I don't know. No one 
has ever not signed the release papers."235 
All of this raises a real and neglected concern in the context of pretrial 
detention reform. Even as the bail reform movement has succeeded in 
ensuring pretrial release more frequently for marginalized defendants, it 
has failed to address the reality that marginalized defendants may still be 
subject to release conditions that are costly, carry significant collateral 
consequences, and receive relatively little scrutiny as to their necessity. 
Whether talking about statutory or constitutional aspects of bail, the 
requirement of a link between the risk and the infringement on liberty is 
constant.236 A court may only impose a condition of release if it promotes 
the state's interest.237 Otherwise, a condition of release is arbitrary and, 
by its very nature, excessive. 2 38 This is true whether discussing monetary 
bail or other conditions of release. 2 39 And yet, nonmonetary conditions of 
230. § 3142(c) (listing possible conditions of release in federal court); see also Tobolowsky 
& Quinn, supra note 8, at 289-90, 290 nn.83-84 (listing state conditions of release). 
231. See Tobolowsky & Quinn, supra note 8, at 309-10, 310 n.146. 
232. See Yang, supra note 186, at 1417. 
233. Interview with Phila. Pub. Def., supra note 8. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. This Article does not mean to suggest that this response reveals a lack of zealous 
advocacy by Ms. Levya or her colleagues but rather reflects a sentiment that when faced with the 
prospect of pretrial detention, the lure of release is too great and defendants will, understandably, 
accept curtailment of their liberty. The Author's own experience in arraignment court as a public 
defender was much the same. Defendants wanted to be free and would accept conditions that 
promoted that freedom, even if such conditions ultimately proved impossible to conform with. 
236. See supra Sections IA, I.B. 
237. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
238. See Gouldin, supranote 64, at 699-700. 
239. See id. 
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release are routinely imposed on defendants prior to trial with little to no 
consideration of the function they actually serve. 240 Part III considers the 
effects of nonmonetary conditions of release, arguing they are worthy 
not only of increased scrutiny but also constitutional challenge. 
III. THE REALITY OF CONDITIONS OF RELEASE 
Even as the most recent iteration of bail reform has enjoyed 
tremendous success in curtailing and, in some states, removing monetary 
bail requirements for some or all offenses, the reality lingers that barring 
bail may increase the probability that a defendant will be released on 
stricter conditions, or not at all. 241 Conditions of release carry equally, if 
not more devastating, collateral consequences for the defendant and her 
community. Courts impose such conditions with minimal or sometimes 
no effort to ascertain their necessity or their utility in mitigating perceived 
risk.242 Further, the administration of such conditions grants tremendous 
discretionary power to pretrial services officers, essentially placing the 
defendant on probation prior to conviction or sentence.243 Not only is this 
reality contrary to the Supreme Court's characterization of permissible 
bail-that linked to the mitigation of legitimate state-identified risks 
but it also perpetuates racial and social inequity in the pretrial system. 244 
This Part explores the realities of nonmonetary conditions of pretrial 
release, arguing that these conditions represent a potentially more 
insidious form of control and future incarceration than the system of bail 
they replaced. As writer and civil rights advocate Michelle Alexander 
notes, "Freedom-even when it's granted, it turns out-isn't really 
free." 245 
A. The Cost of ConditionsofRelease 
Modern bail reform movements have focused in no small part on the 
consequences of pretrial detention on marginalized communities. 246 
240. See id. at 700 & n.22. 
241. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 82, at 52; Tobolowsky & Quinn, supra note 8, at 289-90 
(noting that nonmonetary conditions of release were designed to replace bail). 
242. Professor Fiona Doherty has also noted this in the context of post-conviction release. 
See Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention ofSupervisedRelease, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 958, 1012-13 (2013). 
243. See infra note 287 and accompanying text. 
244. See supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text. 
245. Michelle Alexander, The Newest Jim Crow, N.Y. TimEs (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/opinion/sunday/criminal-justice-reforms-race-technology 
.html [https://perma.cc/7XBH-YCGT]. 
246. See, e.g., National Bail FundNetwork, CMTY. JUST. EXCH., https://www.community 
justiceexchange.org/national-bail-fund-network [https://perma.cc/JW2P-YJML]; Simonson, 
supra note 3, at 599; Charlotte Alter, Black Lives Matter GroupsAre Bailing Black Women Out 
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There is little question that pretrial detention carries tremendous and 
multifaceted burdens for the defendant, her family, and her 
community. 247 Even a short period of detention can cost a defendant her 
home, child custody, or her job.248 Detained defendants are more likely 
to accept plea offers and are less able to assist in their defense than 
defendants who are not detained.2 49 The bail reform movement 
recognizes that bail, even in small or bondable amounts, creates a sort of 
Sophie's choice 250 for marginalized defendants. They can either forgo 
bail and remain detained, or they-or often more accurately their 
community, family, or friends-can pay bail by selling valuables, 
handing over meager savings, or relying on a bond system with its own 
notoriously predatory nature.25 1 For someone without even $500 to post 
for bail or bond, there is no winning choice. 
The difficulty, however, is that in the face of a bail reform movement 
that advocates the wholesale abandonment of monetary bail, courts and 
legislatures have turned to conditions of release as a substitute for 
monetary bail, particularly for defendants with criminal histories, past 
noncompliance with conditions of release (including bail jumping), or 
charges of noneligible offenses. 25 2 Such conditions, however, carry their 
253own set of underexplored consequences. Consider three, for example: 
monetary costs, social costs, and criminogenic effects. 
ofJailforMother'sDay, TIME (May 12, 2017, 6:50 PM), https://time.com/4777976/black-lives-
matter-mothers-day-bail/ [https://perma.cc/WT7V-DK82]; Shawn Carter, Jay Z: For Father's 
Day, I'm Taking on the Exploitative Bail Industry, TIME (June 16, 2017, 2:48 PM), 
https://time.com/4821547/jay-z-racism-bail-bonds/ [https://perma.cc/YK2N-MN8V]. 
247. See Yang, supra note 186, at 1417-29; Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 713-14; Simonson, 
supranote 3, at 595. 
248. Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 713. 
249. See Yang, supra note 186, at 1419. 
250. See generally WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE'S CHOICE (1979). In the novel, the title 
character, Sophie, must choose between her two children. A personally catastrophic choice has 
become known colloquially as a "Sophie's choice." 
251. See BAZELON, supranote 18, at 44-45. 
252. See Tobolowsky & Quinn, supra note 8, at 289 (stating that the legislature has 
developed alternatives to pretrial release in response to public concern regarding crime). 
Conditions of release are often offered as viable alternatives for monetary bail. See, e.g., Yang, 
supra note 186, at 1480-82 (comparing the benefits and risks of electronic monitoring as opposed 
to pretrial detention); Samuel R. Wiseman, PretrialDetention andthe Right to Be Monitored, 123 
YALE L.J. 1344, 1364-68 (2014) (describing the use of electronic monitoring in place of pretrial 
detention). 
253. Yang, supranote 186, at 1480-82 (noting that little work has been done regarding the 
practical realities of electric monitoring); Wiseman, supra note 252, at 1364, 1368-69 (describing 
the concerns surrounding electronic monitoring and the limited research available on its 
effectiveness). 
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To understand such consequences, it is helpful to think of them in the 
context of typical release conditions.254 Some conditions, such as the 
requirement for avoiding new law violations or appearing at all future 
court appearances, carry fewer additional obligations for a defendant than 
others. A defendant must already appear at all future proceedings or risk 
a new arrest for a failure to appear. And like everyone, a defendant risks 
arrest (and detention) if she commits new law violations. 255 
Other conditions, however, carry more onerous obligations, and with 
them, higher collateral consequences whether the defendant complies or 
not. A court may order a defendant, for example, to remain employed or 
in school, to refrain from the use of illegal drugs or alcohol, or to report 
to an assigned pretrial services officer either in person or by phone. 256 A 
court may order a defendant o submit to random urinalysis or other forms 
of randomized drug testing.257 A court may condition a defendant's 
release on her agreement o be tethered to an electronic ankle bracelet that 
utilizes GPS to track her movements (i.e., EHM).258 Or, a court may 
require her to accept placement at a monitored facility, such as a halfway 
house, mental health institution, or drug treatment center.259 A court may 
also order a defendant to submit to work release, where she is permitted 
to leave the pretrial detention facility-usually the county jail-only to 
go to work or school. 26 0 A court, particularly in cases involving known 
victims, may order a defendant to have no contact with a person or place 
during the pendency of the defendant's case. 261 Finally, a court in Oregon 
254. For a list of typical release conditions in federal court, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(B). In 
state court, these types of conditions are common, but broader conditions may also exist (e.g., 
conditions to be good or avoid bad people or bad behavior). See Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws 
and Be Good: Probationand the Meaning ofRecidivism, 104 GEO. L.J. 291, 303-09 (2016). As 
Professor Doherty notes, enforcement of such vague conditions further already broad pretrial 
discretion. Id. at 308. The National Conference of State Legislatures and the National Association 
of Pretrial Services Agencies both provide information about conditions of release in state court 
which includes most commonly the conditions described below. See PretrialRelease Conditions, 
NAT'L CONE. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-
criminal-justice/pretrial-release-conditions.aspx [https://perma.cc/B48Q-B3X8]; Pretrial 
Release, NAT'L ASS'N OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, https://napsa.org/eweb/DynamicPage. 
aspxSite=napsa&WebCode=Release [https://perma.cc/85DX-ZUCG]. Release documents are 
surprisingly hard to locate outside of electronic court dockets. For an example of one such release 
order available in a court's opinion, see United States v. Harcevic, No. 4:15 CR 49, 2015 WL 
1821509, at *1-2 (E.D. Mo. 2015). 
255. Though, as will be discussed, for a defendant, a new law violation may be calculated in 
terms of a new arrest. See infra note 296 and accompanying text. 
256. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(B). 
257. See id. 
258. See id. 
259. See id. 
260. See id. 
261. Id. 
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ordered arrested protestors to "not attend any other protests, rallies, 
assemblies or public gatherings in the state of Oregon" as a condition of 
pretrial release.2 62 This is by no means an exhaustive list of pretrial 
conditions; it is meant to give a sense of what conditions the court might 
impose pretrial. 
Each of these conditions, by their very nature, curtail the defendant's 
liberty to some extent. Some curtailments are minor, others more severe. 
All carry some form of collateral consequence. At the most extreme end, 
the conditions imposed by the Oregon court implicate the defendant's 
First Amendment rights of speech, assembly, and to petition the 
government. Less extreme conditions may create their own burdens. 
Attendance requirements-whether at the next court appearance, a 
meeting with a pretrial services officer, urine or blood collection for drug 
testing, court-ordered drug or mental health treatment, or a particular 
workplace or school-may impose burdens on defendants with little 
access to transportation. Similarly, attendance requirements may prove 
disruptive to other obligations. A defendant who waits for several hours 
in a crowded courtroom for her case to be called may miss work, school, 
or familial obligations. Defendants who work jobs with inflexible 
schedules and poor job security may find that absences for court, pretrial 
services meetings (even those by phone), or drug testing or treatment are 
rewarded with either a reduced work schedule or termination. 
Although some attendance obligations are scheduled in advance and 
may accommodate a defendant's schedule, even these are not always 
reliable. Courts-particularly heavily docketed arraignment, motions, 
and status conference courts-are often overscheduled with multiple 
defendants calendared for a single appearance time. Add overburdened 
prosecutors and defenders to the mix, and even a scheduled appearance 
can consume more time than a defendant's counsel may have predicted 
or a defendant may have allotted. In addition, given the stigma attached 
to criminalization, a defendant may not want to share with an employer, 
teacher, or daycare provider that she has a pending criminal charge, 
leaving the impression that the defendant is unreliable, negligent, or 
uninterested. Ironically, then, for defendants ordered to remain employed 
or enrolled in school, the additional court-imposed attendance 
requirements may challenge the defendant's compliance with the 
employment or education conditions. 263 
262. See Order Setting Conditions of Release at 1, United States v. Meyers, No. 
3:20CR00272 (D. Or. July 27, 2020). 
263. Superficially, attendance requirements may seem a mere necessary burden to a criminal 
charge. Many court appearances, however, do not require a defendant's participation per se, and 
yet the court may require her attendance as a pretrial condition of release. Motions to continue in 
which the defendant agrees with the need for a continuance, for example, do not benefit from the 
2021 ] BEYOND BAIL 187 
Attendance requirements may also carry financial burdens for 
defendants. In addition to lost work time (and therefore wages), 
defendants with obligations to care for children or elderly or disabled 
family members may have to hire someone else to provide the care. Few 
criminal courtrooms are hospitable to young children (if they are allowed 
at all).264 Fewer still offer day care, childcare, or eldercare centers.265 
Transportation may also prove costly for defendants and their families. 
Outside of major metropolitan areas, access to public transportation is 
limited. What does exist may run on an infrequent schedule, rendering 
some attendance obligations all-day, or near all-day, events. 266 
Defendants without access to public transportation must rely on private 
transportation-either their own, borrowed, or rented. Private 
transportation carries additional costs of gas and parking. Many 
courthouses that also house pretrial services offices are located in 
downtown areas, away from residential communities and with limited 
free parking, so defendants may find hidden costs to court attendance or 
in-person pretrial services meetings. Work, school, and treatment 
facilities may enjoy the advantage of proximity to the defendant's home, 
though not always. 
Attendance requirements are not the only conditions that carry a 
monetary burden for defendants. 267 EHM requires a "hook up" fee, which 
defendant's attendance. Some courts agree to waive the defendant's presence if the request is 
submitted in advance, but not all courts do so, and not all attorneys communicate this option to 
the defendant or request to the court in advance, producing a de facto required appearance. 
264. Consider the advice that the Maryland court system gives tojurors on its webpage. After 
listing the dress and decorum expectations in the courtroom, the website states that "[n]o 
courthouse provides child care or elder care. Please, do not bring children or adults needing care 
with you. If you bring a child or adult needing care with you, you could be sanctioned by the 
court." At the Courthouse, MD. CTS., https://mdcourts.gov/juryservice/atcourthouse [https:// 
perma.cc/YSS6-BJ84]. 
265. See id. 
266. In urban areas, such as New York City, public transportation is widely available, and 
websites now provide information regarding schedules and routes for court appearances. See, e.g., 
How to Get to Suffolk County DistrictCourt in CentralIslip, NY by Bus, Train or Subway?, 
MOOVIT, https://moovitapp.com/index/en/publictransit-Suffolk_County District_Court-NYCNJ-
site_14389606-121 [https://perma.cc/Y8V3-82BN] (describing ways to get to the courthouse 
from public transit). But see Fares and Scheduling, ETOWAH CNTY., 
http://etowahcounty.org/fares-and-scheduling/ [https://perma.cc/R9RD-UH22] (noting only fare 
and scheduling information but not directions from public transit). 
267. State and federal courts have repeatedly upheld monetary burdens. See, e.g., United 
States v. Harcevic, No. 4:15 CR 49, 2015 WL 1821509, at *2 ("Defendant must contribute to the 
cost of the services provided by the Pretrial Services Office."); State v. Hardtke, 352 P.3d 771, 
775-76 (Wash. 2015) (en banc) (finding that a court can impose additional costs for pretrial 
supervision up to a statutory maximum); Ex parte Elliott, 950 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1997) (per curiam) (holding that the state's interest in monitoring outweighed the financial burden 
on defendant). Some states have begun to statutorily limit such fees. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE 
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can range between $350 and $450, and a monthly maintenance fee, 
usually in the range of $190 to $450 (specific fees vary by jurisdiction).26 ' 
In addition, defendants are required to maintain internet services at their 
designated location to facilitate tracking.269 Fees for EHM services can 
also vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, creating further 
disparity.2 70 School and treatment programs-assuming an opening at 
either exists-may carry tuition or enrollment fees. Work release 
programs often charge a defendant a "housing" fee to remain in the 
pretrial detention facility when not working.271 Even pretrial services 
meetings in which a defendant is permitted to call a service and confirm 
their location often come with a service fee between $2 and $4 per call. 272 
§ 10.01.160 (2020) (limiting cost for pretrial fees in Washington State Court to $150). For an in-
depth analysis of electronic surveillance, see generally, Kate Weisburd, Punitive Surveillance 
(Nov. 29, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
268. See Wiseman, supra note 252, at 1372-74 (discussing the costs of electronic 
monitoring). While much work has been done on the amount jurisdictions can save by utilizing 
EHM over pretrial detention, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the cost to the defendant. 
See, e.g., Yang, supra note 186, at 1480-82 (providing a summary of studies demonstrating the 
cost and benefit to counties and the state for EHM); JOHN K. ROMAN ET AL., D.C. CRIME POL'Y 
INST., THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING FOR WASHINGTON, D.C. 3-8 (2012), 
https ://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412678-The-Costs-and-
Benefits-of-Electronic-Monitoring-for-Washington-D-C-.PDF [https://perma.cc/6G3K-XDS8] 
(serving as an example of a single state analysis). For information about costs to defendants for 
monitoring services, see Ava Kofman, Digital Jail: How Electronic Monitoring Drives 
Defendants into Debt, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
07/03/magazine/digital-jail-surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/5KA6-49UA]; Emma Anderson 
et al., State-By-State Court Fees, NPR (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/ 
2014/05/19/312455680/state-by-state-court-fees [https://perma.cc/QYZ9-F3YX]. For the 
information provided by one management company regarding payment schedules for EHM 
Offender Management, see OFFENDER MGMT., http://offender-management.com/ [https:// 
perma.cc/D86Q-PL2S]. Some new bail reform proposals suggest EHM as an alternative to bail or 
detention but impose the cost of such monitoring on the defendant. See, e.g.,H.B. 150, 2020 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2020). 
269. See Erik Markowitz, IBT SpecialReport, INT'L BUS. TImES (Sept. 21, 2015, 7:55 AM), 
https://www.ibtimes.com/chain-gang-20-if-you-cant-afford-gps-ankle-bracelet-you-get-thrown-
jail-2065283 [https://perma.cc/GQ74-BREG]. 
270. See Kathryn Casteel & Will Tucker, OpportunityCosts: UnequalJustice in Alabama's 
Community CorrectionsPrograms, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.splcenter 
.org/news/2019/08/15/opportunity-costs-unequal-justice-alabamas-community-corrections-programs 
[https://perma.cc/9WTH-P39H]. 
271. See Sara Feldschreiber, Note, Fee at Last? Work Release ParticipationFees and the 
Takings Clause, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 207, 231-32 (2003). 
272. Service fees are imposed because call-in services are administered by private companies 
that set fee schedules. For an example of one, see OFFENDER MGMT., supranote 268. Admittedly, 
not all aspects of pretrial services require a fee. Many jurisdictions offer free court date reminder 
services either through calls, texts, or emails. For an example of one in Durham County, see 
PretrialServices, DURHAM CNTY. N.C., https://www.dconc.gov/ government/departments-a-
7
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Urinalysis can also carry monetary consequences. Some jurisdictions 
charge pretrial detainees a fee for leaving urine samples at designated 
locations, analysis of the urine, or both.273 
Pretrial conditions can also curtail physical liberty. For example, 
defendants on EHM or work release may only travel within court-
designated perimeters.274 Even within those perimeters, the presence of 
an EHM bracelet may carry a stigma that curtails movement. 275 No-
contact orders also often rely on perimeters for ease of enforcement. 276 A 
court will therefore order a defendant to remain a particular distance 
say 300 feet-from a person or place. Depending on the defendant's 
living, work, or community situation, such perimeters around people or 
locations can necessitate acquiring a new home, job, or neighborhood. 
Like their monetary bail counterparts, nonmonetary conditions of 
release can carry collateral effects as well. In addition to burdens that 
directly affect the defendant-the loss of employment, educational 
opportunities, housing, and money-nonmonetary conditions of release 
and the collateral consequences they carry can impact the defendant's 
family and community. As with monetary bail, financial and other 
obligations are often borne not only by the defendant herself but also by 
those in her immediate and larger community. 2 7 Costs of EHM or a taxi 
to meet a pretrial services officer may be a communal financial obligation 
in the sense that the defendant will not be able to use that money for other 
needs, or the obligation will literally be paid by the community. 
No-contact orders also carry criminogenic effects. 278 A defendant 
accused of either a property crime or a crime against a person may be 
e/criminal-justice-resource-center/pretrial-services [https://perma.cc/ PA6N-N2T4]. Such 
services are also distinguishable as they are truly services, as opposed to imposed conditions. 
273. Professor Doherty has tracked such costs in the context of probation. See Doherty, supra 
note 254, at 314. The Author's own contact with pretrial services offices suggests that such costs 
are the same for pre- and post-conviction monitoring. 
274. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(B); id. § 3154(12). 
275. See Kofman, supra note 268; Markowitz, supra note 269. This stigma remains for many 
defendants even as celebrities have attempted to glamourize their EHM trackers-most notably 
Lindsey Lohan, who commissioned a Chanel cover for her EHM ankle bracelet. See Lindsay 
Lohan Asks Chanel to Trick out Her SCRAAI Bracelet, HUFF POST (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/lindsay-lohan-asks-chanel_n_593154 [https://perma.cc/8WU2-
RPBN]. 
276. See, e.g., I.C.R. 46.2 (requiring no-contact orders to set up distance restrictions). 
277. See Alexander, supra note 245; Markowitz, supra note 269. 
278. See, e.g., State v. Anaya, 976 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (finding the 
willful violation of a pretrial no-contact order not only carried consequences for pretrial release 
but also constituted a separate criminal offense); IDAHO CODE § 18-920 (2020) (providing that the 
violation of a no-contact order is a separate criminal offense); Doherty, supra note 242, at 1005 
(describing this phenomenon in the context of post-trial supervision). 
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ordered to have no contact with either the property or alleged victim.279 
Oftentimes, no-contact orders are surprisingly broad. For example, 
defendants accused of shoplifting from a drug store, such as CVS, may 
not only be ordered to have no contact with the particular CVS store 
alleged in the complaint but with all CVS stores. Likewise, a defendant 
accused of assaulting a particular person may not only be ordered to have 
no contact with that person but also to remain a designated distance from 
that person or to avoid contact with other persons related to the alleged 
victim.280 The consequences of violating a no-contact order are twofold. 
First, the defendant violates a condition of release. This may result in her 
incarceration in the immediate case, and in future risk assessments she 
will score as a higher risk as a result of the violation. 281 Second, the 
defendant violating a no-contact order imposed as a pretrial condition of 
release may face a new, previously unavailable criminal charge of either 
trespass 282 or violation of a no-contact order.283 These new charges stem 
entirely from the existence of the pretrial no-contact order and may 
proceed regardless of whether the defendant is convicted of the offense 
that spawned the no-contact order to begin with.284 In short, the condition 
of release generates a new crime for which the defendant may be 
convicted and sentenced. 
Beyond these costs, conditions of release, like pretrial detention, may 
impact the defendant's ability to maintain housing, custody of children, 
or social stability. 285 Even seemingly innocuous conditions, such as 
reporting to pretrial services, may present significant challenges to 
marginalized defendants. Yet, failure to comply with conditions of 
release, even minor ones, may result in detention and increased risk 
scores on future assessments. 286 For their part, pretrial services officers 
carry tremendous discretionary power to report violations to the court and 
to seek remand to custody. 287 Even a report of a violation alone can 
279. See § 3142(c)(B). 
280. See supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
281. See Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 766. 
282. Criminal trespass is defined in mostjurisdictions as unlawful entry onto property. Eg., 
FLA. STAT. § 810.12 (2020). Under this common statute, a defendant does not have to intend to 
commit an additional crime upon entry. Id. Her entry alone is sufficient for conviction. Id. The 
presence of the no-contact order renders the entry unlawful even for public and semipublic spaces, 
such as the CVS in the hypothetical. 
283. See, e.g., Anaya, 976 P.2d at 1253; § 18-920. 
284. See Anaya, 976 P.2d at 1253; § 18-920. 
285. Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 713. 
286. Id. at 760, 766. 
287. See 18 U.S. C. § 3152 (allowing for the creation ofpretrial services); id. § 3154 (granting 
power to pretrial services to monitor and report violations of conditions of release); 8E GUIDE TO 
JUDICIARY POLICY § § 620.10(a), 620.40.10, 620.40.20 (2010), http://www.madisonattomey.com/ 
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trigger detention.288 Reform movements have rightly bemoaned the bias 
that is often embedded in judicial discretion, but little attention has been 
paid to the power of unelected, and largely unseen, pretrial services 
officers. 289 
Pretrial services officers serve as an informational conduit to the 
court-gathering information about the defendant and monitoring 
compliance with conditions of release. 290 Once the officer suspects a 
violation, he has the discretion to order the defendant's arrest for 
noncompliance with the conditions of release. 291 To be sure, a judge must 
determine whether the reported violation has occurred and whether, given 
the violation, modifications to the defendant's conditions of release are 
necessary. 2 92 But just as short periods of pretrial detention can carry 
devastating collateral consequences, so too can brief periods of detention 
triggered by alleged violations. 
For a condition requiring no new law violations, this problem is 
compounded by the fact that an arrest or a new charge can constitute a 
violation, even if it never leads to a conviction. 2 93 Accordingly, pretrial 
services offices rely entirely on police discretion to support an allegation 
of a violation. 294 Given the overwhelming data that poor and minority 
populations are overpoliced and most often arrested, this condition is 
stacked against marginalized efendants. 295 Beyond this, pretrial services 
officers often fail to take into account whether the offense that forms the 
basis of the "new" charge occurred before or after the matter for which 
the defendant is released.296 In other words, a preceding charge may 
trigger a detention hearing for a defendant. Admittedly, a defendant may 
raise the sequence at the detention hearing or argue that the subsequent 
arrest or even charge is baseless. 2 97 Regardless of whether the judge 
ultimately finds this argument persuasive, the defendant may still have 
cjablog/Monographl09.pdf [https://perma.cc/GL2Z-VGMU] (noting that pretrial services 
officers may exercise discretion regarding their response and offering a list of possible responses). 
288. See § 3154(5), (12)(B). 
289. Professor Doherty has called attention to this in the context of post-conviction 
supervision, see Doherty, supra note 254, at 324, but there is no corresponding work in the context 
of pretrial supervision. 
290. See § 3154(5), (12)(B). 
291. § 3154(12)(B) requires immediate reporting of pretrial violations, but as noted above, 
pretrial services officers exercise discretion regarding such reporting. See 8E GUIDE TO JUDICARY 
POLICY, supranote 287, at §§ 620.40.10, 620.40.20. 
292. See 18 U.S.C. § 3148(a). 
293. See id. § 3154(5), (12)(B); Eaglin, supranote 6, at 76; Doherty, supra note 254, at 324. 
294. See Doherty, supranote 254, at 346. 
295. See Mayson, Bias in, Biasout, supra note 6, at 2284-85. 
296. See Eaglin, supranote 6, at 76. 
297. See § 3148(b) (authorizing a hearing for allegations ofviolations of pretrial conditions). 
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spent twenty-four hours in jail awaiting a hearing after a pretrial services 
officer found her to be in violation of condition of release. 
B. BailReform andConditionsofRelease 
Even as California sat poised to become one of the first states to go to 
a nonmonetary bail system, a position the state ultimately delayed, 298 last-
minute changes to the bill replaced presumptive release with presumptive 
detention. 299 The bill, which got rid of the bail schedule whereby 
defendants were previously assessed a predetermined bail based on the 
charge and the defendant's criminal history, sought to individualize 
release decisions. 300 Changes to the bill, however, complicated this 
calculation. First, and least controversially, under the bill, some 
misdemeanor charges trigger pretrial release within twelve hours of 
arrest. 301 All other defendants must undergo a risk assessment using an 
algorithmic tool, such as those described in Part II.302 Defendants who 
receive a low or medium risk assessment score could be released either 
on their own recognizance or subject to conditions. 303 Those who receive 
a high risk assessment score must remain detained until a judge conducts 
a hearing to assess their level of risk and what conditions, if any, will 
ameliorate such risks.304 
Not only do these changes in California's bail reform statute mirror 
those adopted in other no bail jurisdictions, such as New Jersey and New 
York, but the adoption of the risk assessment tool as a component of such 
reforms also ensures that they will maintain the very bias the reform 
sought to eradicate. 305 Defendants who are members of overpoliced and 
underresourced communities will continue to face an increased 
probability of pretrial detention or release under conditions that may be 
challenging to meet. 
Compared with the highly problematic realities of risk assessment 
tools, which others have extensively explored and that have been the 
greatest challenge to bail reform, 306 the shift from release because a 
298. See Ulloa, supra note 5. 
299. See Meagan Flynn, CaliforniaAbolishes Money Bail with a Landmark Law. But Some 






302. Id.; Alexander, supra note 245. 
303. See Flynn, supra note 299. 
304. Id. 
305. See supra Section IIB. 
306. See supra Section IIB. 
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defendant can post bail toward release on conditions is equally 
troublesome. Put simply, for some defendants, these mechanisms of bail 
reform have replaced one broken system with another-another system 
that systematically disadvantages poor and marginalized defendants. 
C. GoingForward 
Each of the collateral consequences of pretrial release carries its own 
significant concerns, yet little work has been done to challenge their 
imposition or even to determine if the imposed conditions actually 
achieve their purported goals. Perhaps conditions of release, despite their 
impact, are seen as more benign or desirable than monetary bail or 
detention. 307 It is important to recognize, however, that such conditions, 
like bail or detention, place burdens on defendants who have neither been 
convicted nor sentenced for the alleged crime that is used to justify the 
imposition of the conditions in the first place. Courts impose conditions 
following truncated hearings, often relying on checklists or party 
agreements, with little proof as to whether such conditions accomplish 
their perceived goals of ensuring appearance or reducing whatever danger 
the defendant's presence in the community might pose.308 
For their part, scholars, activists, and advocates have likewise done 
little work to draw the link between the perceived risk and the conditions 
imposed. 309 What data are available suggest hat intensive pretrial 
supervision of defendants has done little to reduce recidivism or promote 
community well-being.310 Instead, a Brookings Institute report concluded 
that reducing the burden of pretrial supervision would promote jobs, 
improve childcare, and reduce stigmatization.311 "This would be a good 
first step toward breaking the vicious incarceration cycle." 312 
Going forward, it is clear that more work needs to be done regarding 
the impact and efficacy of pretrial release conditions. This work needs to 
focus not only on the text of the statutes and rules that govern these 
307. See, e.g., Yang, supra note 186, at 1481-82; Wiseman, supra note 252, at 1364; 
Tobolowsky & Quinn, supranote 8, at 289. 
308. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
309. But see Joseph Darius Jaafari, IllinoisPutsAnkle Monitors on Thousands. Now It Has 
to Figure out Who Gets Tracked and Why, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 15, 2019), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/07/15/illinois-puts-ankle-monitors-on-thousands-of-
people-now-it-has-to-figure-out-exactly-who-gets-tracked-and-why [ ttps://perma.cc/8BGS-ZLS4] 
(discussing an Illinois bill that aims to improve accountability on the part of corrections officials 
by requiring them to maintain and publish data on electronic monitoring of former prisoners). 
310. See Ouss & Stevenson, supra note 179, at 24; Jennifer L. Doleac, Study after Study 
Shows Ex-Prisoners Would be Better Off Without Intense Supervision, BROOKINGS INST. 
(July 2, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/07/02/study-after-study-shows-
ex-prisoners-would-be-better-off-without-intense-supervision/ [https://perma.cc/6QHZ-299H]. 
311. See Doleac, supra note 310. 
312. Id. 
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conditions but also their application. The on-the-ground view of such 
conditions is one of saddled communities and defendants for whom the 
promise of release is burdened and sometimes impossible. Some have 
taken an abolitionist stance regarding particular conditions. 313 This 
stance-particularly as it relates to extreme conditions of release-is 
beneficial but alone it is insufficient. Courts and advocates alike need to 
take the realities of conditions of release seriously. They need to take 
seriously the charge that impositions on pretrial liberties must be justified 
by more than mere fear, but by evidence that a condition is needed and 
that it actually promotes articulated goals. They need to take seriously the 
cultural, social, and political realities that have rendered the criminal 
system a tool of racial and economic oppression. 
As a result, while this Article acknowledges that some pretrial release 
conditions curtail more liberty than others, it has not tried to rank or 
categorize conditions of release in terms of their acceptability based on 
the harm they carry. There is a temptation to do so. There is a temptation 
to conclude that some conditions would be tolerable if they were offered 
at a reduced cost or more discerningly. There is a temptation to conclude 
that some minor impositions on pretrial liberty could be forgiven if other 
conditions were barred altogether. There is a temptation to conclude that 
human psychology suggests that judges in many cases will avoid greater 
impositions on liberty if they can readily impose lesser ones. For each of 
these reasons, there is a temptation to offer up a ranking of pretrial release 
conditions and to conclude that because some conditions are admittedly 
less imposing than others that these lesser conditions are acceptable. To 
give in to this temptation, however, would be to miss one of this Article's 
primary claims-that the imposition of conditions of pretrial release 
should not be lawless or a due process free-for-all. Any pretrial 
deprivation of liberty demands process and justification. No matter how 
small the imposition-even an agreement o return to court, to maintain 
employment, or to avoid a new arrest-the fact that the imposition occurs 
at all requires the state and the court to justify the need for the condition 
in the first place. 
Certainly, there are different ways to think about honing pretrial 
release to its constitutionally defined purpose. Most obviously, courts 
could develop a robust process around pretrial detention-engaging in an 
examination not only of the risk a defendant presents but also the 
conditions that might actually mitigate that risk and the community's 
assessment of that risk. This process could require the traditional 
procedural rights associated with trial-appointment of counsel, right to 
discovery, right to call and cross-examine witnesses, presumption of 
innocence, and even a right to a jury. It should also acknowledge that 
313. See Alexander, supra note 245. 
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multiple stakeholders-the state represented by the judge and prosecutor, 
the defendant, the complaining witness, and the community-may have 
distinct calibrations of risk and appropriate conditions, prompting the 
questions of who precisely poses a danger to the community and what is 
that danger. 
Building flexibility into the conditions themselves may also hone 
pretrial conditions. Allow defendants to bring children to court or 
establish day or night care facilities to accommodate defendants and their 
families. Allow "off-hour" courts to accommodate defendants' work 
schedules. Offer multiple satellite pretrial services offices to reduce travel 
obligations. Send free reminders to defendants regarding upcoming court 
dates and establish meaningful grace periods for failures to appear. 
Permit telephonic appearances for some court dates. Allow meaningful 
reconsideration of imposed conditions. The list goes on and could go on 
far beyond any permitted word count for a law review submission. Each 
of these proposals, some of which have been instituted in limited 
jurisdictions, acknowledge a defendant's lived experience in crafting the 
conditions of her pretrial release. They, in turn, require a court to 
contemplate the humanity of the defendant-the defendant as a person-
as opposed to the defendant as a danger that must be contained and 
controlled by conditions. 
Contemplating the humanity of a defendant in pretrial release 
conditions also highlights the reality that pretrial detention considerations 
are one stage in a criminal justice process that is riddled with bias and 
inequities and that is premised on the dehumanization of the people who 
move within it as defendants. To think of pretrial release conditions as 
one point on a continuum raises questions akin to those above of what is 
a sufficient risk or danger, as well as more fundamental questions of what 
is criminal and what is a "just" response? As jurisdictions experiment 
with the decriminalization of marijuana possession, the question becomes 
why not decriminalize all nonviolent misdemeanors? Or, in the 
alternative, why not adopt mechanisms beyond a carceral system to 
address these types of offenses? Why not seek more community input at 
the outset as to the appropriate resolution of an alleged offense? It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to explore such proposals in a way they 
deserve-they are admittedly complex and raise their own risks of cruel 
punitiveness and intergenerational burdens. But it would also be remiss 
not to acknowledge, even in this last paragraph, that pretrial detention 
considerations and the conditions they generate are symptoms of a system 
built on the backs of poor and marginalized people-a system that has 
lost credibility as it has languished too long in cruelty and prejudice. 
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CONCLUSION 
The fight against monetary bail is in no small part a fight against 
economic discrimination. It was, and still is, a fight against the reality in 
which, to borrow Professor Butler's assessment of the appointed counsel 
system, poor people lose because they are poor.314 Under a monetary bail 
system, defendants are detained as much because they cannot pay bail as 
they are because they represent a real risk of flight or danger to the 
community. Studies have demonstrated that monetary bail does little to 
mitigate such risks. With or without monetary bail, defendants return to 
court and reoffend at the same rate. For its part, pretrial detention carries 
awful consequences for an already marginalized population. In jail, 
awaiting trial, a defendant may lose her dignity, her home, her family, her 
job, her educational opportunities and, eventually, her ability or 
willingness to contest her charges. As others have observed, pretrial 
detention becomes the means by which the state grinds a guilty plea out 
of a defendant. 
In contrast, release is good. Release permits a defendant to maintain 
all that she might lose in pretrial detention, and it creates the opportunities 
to either fight an accusation or to negotiate a disposition from a position 
of (relative) power. Yet, without monetary bail, courts increasingly rely 
on nonmonetary conditions of release to guard against risk of flight or 
danger to the community. These conditions, like their purely monetary 
counterparts, carry their own consequences-consequences that fall 
harder and faster on poor and minority defendants. Nonmonetary 
conditions of release are imposed with an assumption that they will 
produce the desired mitigation of risk, yet with no supporting data that 
they accomplish their purported goals. 
Pretrial detention has always been a predictive balancing process 
with courts weighing the potential risk the defendant poses against the 
presumption of innocence and the right to be set free. Ask any criminal 
defendant in any courthouse in America and she will tell you that 
accusations carry a burden of curtailed liberty no matter who you are or 
how good your defense might be. For years, courts accepted at face value 
that defendants with "skin in the game" in the form of bail would return 
to court and those without it would not. Analysis has proved this 
assumption both false and biased, and the use of monetary bail has 
receded. In its place, conditions of release have emerged, premised on the 
same assumption that supported the monetary bail system-some 
conditions must be imposed to ensure appearance and safety. Yet, that 
assumption has not been justified, and courts and commentators alike 
314. Paul D. Butler, Essay, PoorPeopleLose: Gideon andthe Critique ofRights, 122 YALE 
L.J. 2176, 2178 (2013). 
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have overlooked the extent to which nonmonetary conditions of release 
place unwarranted burdens on defendants awaiting trial. 
For all the good work that has been done to right that balance of 
pretrial detention and to reduce bias, little work has been done to push 
back against the untested proposition that pretrial conditions of release 
serve a desired end. This is a mistake. It is a mistake as a constitutional 
matter, as the ability of nonmonetary conditions of release to promote the 
state's goals remains unvetted. And it is a mistake as a matter of social 
policy, as these conditions carry debilitating consequences for marginal 
defendants and their communities. If society is to be serious about 
correcting the devastating impact of pretrial detention, it must be serious 
about demanding that all conditions of release, monetary or otherwise, be 
both fair and justified. 

